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JANUS-FACED JUDGING: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS
RADICALLY WEAKENING STARE DECISIS
MICHAEL GENTITHES*
ABSTRACT
Drastic changes in Supreme Court doctrine require citizens to
reorder their affairs rapidly, undermining their trust in the judi-
ciary. Stare decisis has traditionally limited the pace of such change
on the Court. It is a bulwark against wholesale jurisprudential
reversals. But, in recent years, the stare decisis doctrine has come
under threat.
With little public or scholarly notice, the Supreme Court has
radically weakened stare decisis in two ways. First, the Court has
reversed its long-standing view that a precedent, regardless of the
quality of its reasoning, should stand unless there is some special,
practical justification to overrule it. Recent decisions instead claim
that “poor reasoning” in a prior decision justifies overruling cases.
Second, the Court has discredited older precedents. The Court has
claimed such older decisions have less weight because they may have
violated individual rights during their life span.
The radical weakening of stare decisis presents a grave threat to
legal stability. Justices can always find reasoning they believe is
“poor” in prior decisions, which they can also claim have long
violated citizens’ rights. Under this formulation, stare decisis
provides little restraint against changing course. It also opens the
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door to “wave theories” of stare decisis, whereby new Justices seeking
rapid change can claim fidelity to a weak version of stare decisis
early in their careers, only to suggest a stronger version later to
protect their own decisions. 
This weakening of stare decisis has deep analytical flaws that
would allow perpetual changes to legal doctrine based simply on the
current Justices’ preferences. The Court must not accept the alarming
effects this movement would have on legal stability, doctrinal
consistency, and judicial legitimacy.
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INTRODUCTION
Following several recent changes on the Supreme Court’s bench,
pundits have speculated that the Court may be willing to overturn
prior decisions in controversial constitutional cases.1 Though such
forecasts are speculative,2 there is evidence that a weaker version
of stare decisis—the presumption that the Supreme Court generally
should not overrule its prior decisions—is in vogue on the Court.
The 2018 decision Janus v. American Federation of State, County,
and Municipal Employees, Council 31 has emerged as a new leading
precedent on precedents.3 The Court cited it twice in the 2018 Term
in cases in which it overruled a precedent.4 In two further opinions,
Justice Gorsuch cited Janus when he would have overruled other
precedents.5 And in the 2019 Term, Justices across the ideological
spectrum cited Janus in two major decisions, frequently using
Janus’s stare decisis framework to argue for overruling precedent.6
1. See, e.g., Alexandra Hutzler, Supreme Court Overturning 40-Year-Old Precedent Is
‘Deeply Disturbing’ Decision for Other Landmark Cases: Experts, NEWSWEEK (May 13, 2019,
4:32 PM), https://www.newsweek.com/supreme-court-overrule-precedent-roe-v-wade-1424322
[https://perma.cc/MGJ6-DGZC]; In a Heartbeat—The New Push to Overturn Roe v. Wade,
ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 2019), https://www.economist.com/united-states/2019/04/13/the-new-
push-to-overturn-roe-v-wade [https://perma.cc/4EDS-8YNE]; Scott Lemieux, Yes, Roe Really
Is in Trouble, VOX (May 15, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2019/5/15/18623073/roe-
wade-abortion-georgia-alabama-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/S5YP-FK6Y]; Adam Liptak,
Justices Split over the Power of Precedent, N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/05/13/us/politics/supreme-court-precedent-vote.html [https://perma.cc/W8CK-4YH6];
Nina Totenberg, Supreme Court Overturns Precedent in Property Rights Case—A Sign of
Things to Come?, NPR (June 22, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/22/734919303/
supreme-court-overturns-precedent-in-property-rights-case-a-sign-of-things-to-co [https://
perma.cc/WR2Y-WDCF]; AJ Willingham, The Supreme Court Has Overturned More than 200
of Its Own Decisions. Here’s What It Could Mean for Roe v. Wade, CNN (May 29, 2019, 7:31
AM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/29/politics/supreme-court-cases-overturned-history-consti
tution-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/K28Y-TLE7].
2. In fact, those predicting immediate reversals of abortion rulings proved incorrect, at
least for now. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
3. 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018).
4. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019); Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca. v. Hyatt,
139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019).
5. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2445 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Gamble v.
United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 2006 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
6. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 2152
(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2170-71 (Alito, J., dissenting); Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct.
1390, 1409 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 1411, 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring);
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Though others have noted Janus’s importance,7 this Article provides
the first analysis both of that decision’s place within a broader
movement to weaken stare decisis and of the two unseemly changes
that movement has made to stare decisis doctrine: (1) permitting
the Court to overrule a precedent simply because of its “poor
reasoning,” and (2) discrediting older precedents because they may
have violated individual rights during their life span.
Janus’s formulation of the stare decisis doctrine is a new zenith
in the “weak” stare decisis tradition. The weak tradition posits that
“poor reasoning” in a prior decision is not merely a condition
precedent to stare decisis analysis but is also a substantive
consideration in that analysis that may itself justify a reversal.8 By
contrast, under the “strong” stare decisis tradition, a precedent
should stand unless there is some “special justification” to overrule
it, regardless of the quality of its reasoning.9 Potential justifica-
tions include whether the precedent “def[ies] practical workability,”
is subject to special reliance interests, is a mere “remnant of
id. at 1439 (Alito, J., dissenting).
7. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Stare Decisis—Rhetoric and Reality in the Supreme Court,
2018 SUP.CT.REV. 121, 137-38 (“Although none of the justifications in Janus for disregarding
or overruling a precedent was entirely new in that case, the very act of listing and purporting
to use all of them lays the groundwork in future cases for a further weakening of whatever
strength a norm of stare decisis may hold.”).
Justice Kagan also noted the heavy reliance several Justices placed on Janus’s formulation
of the stare decisis doctrine when dissenting from the Court’s decision in Knick. See 139 S. Ct.
at 2190 (Kagan, J., dissenting). According to Kagan, the Knick majority overruled a 1985
precedent with little more in support than a citation to Janus, “[the 2018] Term’s decision
overruling a [forty]-year-old precedent.” Id. (criticizing the Court’s decision to overrule
Williamson County Regulatory Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
U.S. 172 (1985)). Kagan warned that “[i]f that is the way the majority means to proceed—
relying on one subversion of stare decisis to support another—we may as well not have
principles about precedents at all.” Id.
8. Caleb Nelson, Stare Decisis and Demonstrably Erroneous Precedents, 87 VA. L. REV.
1, 53 (2001) (describing a “weak” form of stare decisis that “would begin by asking whether
the past decision reflects a permissible or an impermissible view of the underlying law,” then
presumptively overruling impermissible, “demonstrably erroneous” interpretations); Colin
Starger, The Dialectic of Stare Decisis Doctrine, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 19, 29 (Christopher J. Peters ed., 2013) (describing the “weak conception of
stare decisis” as that which “sanctions overruling if a challenged precedent suffers from ‘bad
reasoning’”).
9. See Starger, supra note 8, at 29 (describing the “strong” conception of stare decisis as
that which “requires a ‘special justification’ for overruling beyond mere belief that the
challenged precedent was ‘wrongly decided’”).
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abandoned doctrine,” or is based upon facts that have changed so
significantly that the rule is no longer applicable.10
Prior to Janus, the most prominent example of the weak stare
decisis tradition was the Court’s discussion in Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission.11 In that case, the Court overruled a
twenty-year-old precedent12 by emphasizing the “quality of reason-
ing” in that opinion, discussing it first in its stare decisis analysis
before mentioning any other factors.13
In Janus, the Court made that weakened version of stare decisis
even weaker. The majority’s reformulated list of stare decisis factors
undermined the doctrine in two ways.14 First, Janus placed “quality
of ... reasoning” as the very first factor Justices should consider
when unsatisfied with a precedent, and the whole of its analysis of
Abood focused on its substantive flaws.15 This suggests that poor
reasoning in a prior decision is more than just a cause to turn to
stare decisis analysis; it is instead a sufficient condition to overturn
decisions. That elevates the “poor reasoning” factor to new and
dangerous prominence.
Poor reasoning provides an ever-present justification for over-
turning decisions. Conversations about stare decisis only arise,
after all, when current Justices believe that a prior decision was
10. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (plurality
opinion). Strong stare decisis is expressed most clearly in Casey. See Starger, supra note 8,
at 39.
11. 558 U.S. 310 (2010); see Starger, supra note 8, at 30.
12. Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 310.
13. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 363. The Citizens United Court used a formulation of
stare decisis that analyzed the precedent’s “workability, ... the antiquity of the precedent, the
reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.” Id. at 362-
63 (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009)). The Citizens United Court
borrowed its formulation from Montejo v. Louisiana, a 2009 case that likewise included the
quality of the precedent’s reasoning as the last factor to consider within the doctrine. See
Montejo, 556 U.S. at 792-93.
14. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2478 (2018). It is worth noting that simply by articulating any standards at all while
considering stare decisis, a Justice ascribes some content and value to prior decisions, even
if only at a theoretical level. That Justice should, therefore, have some interest in the
normative desirability of the factors they include in the doctrine.
15. Id. at 2478-86.
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substantively incorrect and might warrant a change in direction.16
Stare decisis in the wake of Janus would provide little restraint
against changing course.17 Such a conception of stare decisis would
be unable to settle disputes independent of the Justices’ views about
the substantive correctness of a decision or the proper method to
achieve substantively correct results.18 Widespread adoption of
Janus would significantly undermine doctrinal stability. The ability
of judicial precedents to make the law “certain and known” through
public announcement and repeated confirmation would be signifi-
cantly reduced.19 It would also undermine judicial legitimacy. The
Court and the appointments process would become even more
overtly politicized than they are today. Janus might also undermine
legal consistency if lower courts freely deviate from Supreme Court
precedent that appears substantively incorrect. The stare decisis
doctrine itself would be rendered so incoherent and unworkable that
it could hardly be considered a doctrine at all; even Janus’s
supporters will struggle to identify any consensus about the sub-
stantive correctness of prior decisions. Janus’s emerging role as an
authoritative precedent on precedent thus presents a grave danger.
The second way that the Janus formulation diluted the stare
decisis doctrine was by overemphasizing the importance of a
16. See, e.g., RANDY KOZEL, SETTLED VERSUS RIGHT: A THEORY OF PRECEDENT 102 (2017)
(“By tethering a decision’s continued vitality to the perceived gravity of its offenses—a
perception that will vary from [J]ustice to [J]ustice—the prevailing approach to stare decisis
robs precedents of independent value beyond their attractiveness on the merits.”); Schauer,
supra note 7, at 140 (“[T]he essence of a stare decisis claim is a content-independent appeal
to respecting mistaken decisions despite their being mistaken.”); June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v.
Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (“[F]or precedent to mean
anything, the doctrine [of stare decisis] must give way only to a rationale that goes beyond
whether the case was decided correctly.”). As Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged when asked
about overruling precedent during his confirmation hearings, “it is not enough that you may
think the prior decision was wrongly decided. That really doesn’t answer the question. It just
poses the question.” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
144 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts Hearing] (response of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., to
questioning by Sen. Arlen Specter, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary).
17. Schauer, supra note 7, at 128 (“For stare decisis to be of genuine importance, it must
tell decision makers to make decisions they think mistaken on first-order substantive
grounds.”).
18. See KOZEL, supra note 16, at 61.
19. See Letter from James Madison to Charles J. Ingersoll (June 25, 1831), in 4 LETTERS
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 183, 184 (Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott & Co. 1865).
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precedent’s age in determining its precedential weight. This factor
came to prominence in two 2009 decisions, Montejo v. Louisiana20
and Pearson v. Callahan,21 in which the Court suggested that youn-
ger precedents can be more readily overturned,22 though that trend
was mitigated recently by the Court’s deference to a four-year-old
decision in 2020’s June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo.23 In con-
trast to the Montejo/Pearson approach, the Janus court suggested
that some older precedents should receive less precedential weight
as well.24 For the Janus Court, older decisions that are substan-
tively incorrect may have been violating citizens’ rights for a longer
period and are thus more dubious.25 Additionally, because older
decisions may have been judicially criticized over their long life
span, rational actors have likely disregarded them, weakening the
precedent’s value.26
Janus’s claims invert the relationship between a precedent’s age
and its jurisprudential stability, even within the weak stare decisis
tradition. If the fact that a precedent has been around for decades
suggests that its substantive correctness is actually more dubious—
no matter whether others have reviewed the precedent and
supported it—the doctrine is far weaker. Older decisions can easily
be discarded because they are both likely to have been criticized by
20. 556 U.S. 778 (2009).
21. 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
22. In Montejo, the Court wrote that “[b]eyond workability, the relevant factors in
deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the
precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well
reasoned.” 556 U.S. at 792-93 (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234-35). Pearson itself did not use
that “antiquity” language, instead only stating that “[r]evisiting precedent is particularly
appropriate where ... the precedent consists of a judge-made rule that was recently adopted
to improve the operation of the courts.” 555 U.S. at 233.
23. 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
24. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478-
86 (2018).
25. Id. at 2486. Justice Alito wrote that “[i]t is hard to estimate how many billions of
dollars have been taken from nonmembers and transferred to public-sector unions in violation
of the First Amendment. Those unconstitutional exactions cannot be allowed to continue
indefinitely.” Id.
26. Id. at 2484-85. Alito suggested that it was permissible to overrule Abood because, in
recent years, the Court had been especially critical of its underpinnings. Id. at 2484. Thus,
Alito explained that “public-sector unions have been on notice for years regarding this Court’s
misgivings about Abood.... During this period of time, any public-sector union seeking an
agency-fee provision in a collective-bargaining agreement must have understood that the
constitutionality of such a provision was uncertain.” Id. at 2484-85.
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someone at some time and may have worked a substantive injustice
upon citizens for a long period of time. When combined with earlier
suggestions in the weak stare decisis tradition that young prece-
dents are also entitled to less deference,27 Janus’s conception of the
doctrine seems to undermine the value of any precedent, no matter
its vintage.
The Janus view of a precedent’s age also opens the door to what
I call a “wave theory” of stare decisis. Using either the Janus or the
Montejo/Pearson approach to a precedent’s age, Justices can make
contrary suggestions about stare decisis’s binding strength over
time. A new Justice can begin her career by claiming fidelity to a
weak stare decisis tradition that allows her to rapidly overrule cases
with which she substantively disagrees, only to transition to a
strong stare decisis tradition later in her career in an effort to
protect her perceived gains from being overruled by subsequent
judicial generations. Such waves in stare decisis are intellectually
inconsistent, as the Justice who ascribes to changing conceptions of
stare decisis over time in fact ascribes to no real, binding version of
stare decisis at all. Furthermore, wave theories would render stare
decisis so malleable as to become meaningless, rendering all
precedents vulnerable to being overruled at any time.
Instead, a decision’s age, and subsequent decisions reaffirming it,
should increase its precedential weight. Although commentators
have warned against the dangers of overruling a precedent too
quickly28—a concern some Justices have also recognized29—history
27. See Montejo, 556 U.S. at 792-93; Pearson, 555 U.S. at 233.
28. See, e.g., KOZEL, supra note 16, at 125 (“Abrupt overrulings following changes in the
Court’s composition can blur the line between the meaning of the Constitution and the
identity of the individuals who occupy the bench.”).
29. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the Court’s decision to overrule recent precedents in which “[n]either the law nor
the facts” but “[o]nly the personnel of this Court” had changed); STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING
OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW 151 (2010) (“Will a new case that resolves
uncertainty long remain the law, or will a new Court overturn it, thereby denying the public
the advantages of the newer, ‘better’ second decision for which the Court had hoped? At the
same time, a Court that overturns too many earlier decisions encourages the public to believe
that personalities or politics, not law, determine the outcome of Court cases. And that belief
undermines the public’s confidence in the Court.”); see also KOZEL, supra note 16, at 124-25.
Chief Justice Roberts’s concurrence in June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo does not
expressly take this position, but it implicitly supports it by holding that the four-year-old
decision in Whole Woman’s Health was binding. See 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133-34 (2020) (Roberts,
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shows that the Supreme Court has been more willing to overturn
recent, rather than older, decisions.30 Janus undermines this
reverence for the long-decided precedent. Instead, the Justices
should give some deference to ancient precedents, with perhaps a
special examination of the factual underpinnings of those decisions
to guard against the possible inapplicability of those precedents
under changed factual conditions. In addition, relatively new
precedents should be subject to genuinely critical review, thereby
ensuring that when a precedent has aged well on the Court, it has
been substantively reaffirmed by generations of Justices who had a
genuine opportunity to reconsider it.
This Article will proceed as follows. After initially tracing the
evolution of stare decisis doctrine in the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence, the Article outlines the emergence of Janus as a pivotal
precedent on precedent in the present day. The Article will then
consider how the Janus formulation of stare decisis renders it
almost incoherently ineffectual given the emphasis it places on the
quality of a precedent’s reasoning. Such poor reasoning is ever-
present when Justices consider stare decisis, and thus its promi-
nence will often tip the scales against upholding prior decisions.
Next, the Article will consider how Janus alters the weight of a
precedent based upon its age. The Article will explain how this
factor wrongly suggests that older precedents are more dubious if
C.J., concurring).
30. See Willingham, supra note 1 (noting that, of the more than three hundred occasions
the Court has formally overruled one of its own decisions, more than 50 percent occurred
when the decision was less than twenty years old). Justice Breyer seemed to acknowledge this
reality when he argued that
the more recently the earlier case was decided, the less forcefully the stare
decisis anti-overruling principle should be applied. When only a short time has
elapsed, we may not yet know that a decision will have harmful effects; it is also
unlikely that either the bar or the public will yet have relied significantly upon
the earlier case.
BREYER, supra note 29, at 152.
However, Randy Kozel states that when the Court argues that recent decisions have
weakened the doctrinal underpinnings of a precedent, as it did when overruling Abood in
Janus, “the consequence is to elevate the new over the old.” KOZEL, supra note 16, at 124.
Thus, “[t]he principle that newer opinions can ‘undermin[e]’ the ‘doctrinal underpinnings’ of
older ones means that in some cases, recent decisions take priority.” Id. (second alteration in
original) (quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)).
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they have been criticized at any time in their life span and worked
any potential constitutional injustice upon citizens.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF STARE DECISIS IN THE SUPREME COURT
This Part briefly reviews the history and evolution of the doctrine
of stare decisis in the Supreme Court. The concept of stare decisis
has deep historical roots31 that heavily influenced the thinking of
America’s founding generation.32 Yet the phrase itself did not play
a significant role in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence until the
early twentieth century. Prior to 1916, “the phrase ‘stare decisis’
appeared in only forty published decisions” of the Supreme Court.33
Though reliance on precedent was a judicial norm in the early days
of the republic, it was an implicit, unexpressed one in most pub-
lished rulings.34
When Justice Louis Brandeis joined the Court, he began catalog-
ing the nascent doctrine of stare decisis more formally. In his first
two decades on the Court, “Brandeis so carefully mined and cate-
gorized the Court’s own ‘precedent about precedent’ in his opinions
that his attendant framework for the proper application of stare
decisis itself assumed canonical authority.”35 This work culminated
31. See, e.g., W. F. Kuzenski, Stare Decisis, 6 MARQ. L. REV. 65, 66 (1922) (“The origin of
the doctrine of stare decisis is lost in antiquity. It is known to have been in effect long before
the days of Hale and Blackstone. Some theorize that it originated in the Witenagemote, where
all the men both made the laws and adjusted them, and that power of judging was afterwards
assumed by the advisors who became the earliest judges. Others, like Spence, contend that
the rule of precedent had its origin in the jus praetorium of the Roman Law, where the praetor
issued irrevocable edicts having the effect of laws.” (citations omitted)).
32. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO.78, at 383 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003)
(“To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound
down by strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every
particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be conceived from the variety of
controversies which grow out of the folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of those
precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and must demand long and
laborious study to acquire a competent knowledge of them.”). The Constitution itself, however,
contains no express reference to the concept or any specific rules of judicial adjudication.
Starger, supra note 8, at 22.
33. Starger, supra note 8, at 22. Starger adds that “the vast majority of these early stare
decisis references involved no analysis of the concept. Instead, invocation of the maxim
usually served a simple rhetorical function in arguments about following precedent.” Id. at
23.
34. See id. at 22-23.
35. Id. at 26.
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in Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.,36
to which today’s competing strong and weak traditions of stare
decisis each claim fidelity.37
Coronado Oil concerned the federal government’s ability to tax a
private corporation that claimed an “instrumentality of the [s]tate”
exemption from federal tax.38 The Coronado Oil majority ruled in
the corporation’s favor, relying heavily upon a prior decision,
Gillespie v. Oklahoma, that previously applied that exemption to a
private corporation that derived its income from state contracts.39
In his dissent, Justice Brandeis railed against Gillespie, arguing
that it “was wrongly decided and should now be frankly overruled.”40
Brandeis quickly noted that “[s]tare decisis is not ... a universal,
inexorable command.”41 Its application was within the Court’s
discretion when the same issues arose in a subsequent case.42 For
several pages thereafter, Brandeis discussed the doctrine’s meaning
and limits, creating a touchstone for future debates about the role
of stare decisis.43 Brandeis’s discussion provided fodder for each of
today’s competing weak and strong stare decisis traditions.
In possible support of a weak tradition that would allow over-
ruling based largely upon the quality of the reasoning in a prior
case, Brandeis described a sliding scale of stare decisis.44 He noted
that the Court could more readily reverse course to correct consti-
tutional errors that the legislature could not easily remedy.45 In
those cases, “[t]he Court bows to the lessons of experience and the
force of better reasoning.”46 This language suggests that only well-
reasoned decisions in constitutional cases must be preserved, a view
Brandeis supported further when he added that the “Court must, in
36. 285 U.S. 393, 405-06 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
37. See Starger, supra note 8, at 29-35.
38. 285 U.S. at 398. The corporation argued that because it derived all of its income from
leases with the state, it should not be subject to federal taxation. Id.
39. Id. (“[T]he present claim of exemption cannot be distinguished from the one presented
in [Gillespie v. Oklahoma] and we adhere to the rule there approved.” (citing Gillespie v.
Oklahoma, 247 U.S. 501 (1922))).
40. Id. at 405 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 405-08.
43. See id. at 405-13.
44. Id. at 406-08.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 407-08.
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order to reach sound conclusions, feel free to bring its opinions into
agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained, so that
its judicial authority may ... depend altogether on the force of the
reasoning by which it is supported.”47 Brandeis thus appeared to
suggest that poorly reasoned precedents could be overruled, much
in the way that today’s weak stare decisis tradition focuses on the
quality of a precedent’s reasoning as the primary, and perhaps only,
consideration when determining whether to overrule that
precedent.48
Brandeis’s Coronado Oil dissent also offered support for a strong
stare decisis tradition, which would require the Court to consider
factors aside from mere disagreement with the reasoning of prior
cases before overruling. Brandeis believed that “in most matters it
is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than
that it be settled right.”49 Brandeis then carefully distinguished
cases that involve “decisions of fact” from cases applying the law to
facts, noting that “the decision of the fact [may] have been rendered
upon an inadequate presentation of then existing conditions, [and]
the conditions may have changed meanwhile.”50 Additionally,
Brandeis noted that “the judgment of the Court in the earlier
decision may have been influenced by prevailing views as to
economic or social policy which have since been abandoned.”51
Brandeis thus canonized two possible justifications for overruling,
beyond mere substantive disagreement with the prior opinion, that
stand at the heart of today’s strong stare decisis tradition: changes
in the underlying facts that undermine the old rule and alterations
in prevailing views that render the prior decision “a remnant of
abandoned doctrine.”52
In the decades since Coronado Oil, supporters of both the strong
and weak stare decisis traditions have claimed to follow the spirit
of Brandeis’s dissent. The weak tradition evolved in cases claiming
that Justices should not follow precedents that are poorly reasoned.
47. Id. at 412-13 (internal quotations omitted).
48. See Starger, supra note 8, at 29-30.
49. Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. at 406 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 412.
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
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For instance, Justice Reed suggested in 1944’s Smith v. Allwright
that “when convinced of former error, this Court has never felt
constrained to follow precedent” in constitutional cases.53 Chief
Justice Rehnquist similarly suggested that reversals are appropri-
ate whenever a prior decision is “badly reasoned” in his 1991
opinion in Payne v. Tennessee.54
In contrast, following Coronado Oil, the strong stare decisis
tradition has sought to clarify that precedents can only be over-
turned based upon objective factors, not including the current
Justices’ disagreement with a prior decision’s reasoning. For
instance, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion in Arizona v. Rumsey
claimed that prior decisions, no matter how substantively incorrect,
could only be overturned when some “special justification” was
present.55 Rumsey thus arguably attempted to formalize Brandeis’s
aphorism that often it is best that the Court settle the law, marking
the beginning of an effort to explicitly detail the conditions under
which reversals were possible. That claim found purchase again in
Payne, in which a dissenting Justice Marshall objected to overrul-
ing prior cases merely because they included a narrow majority and
a spirited dissent.56 Marshall quoted O’Connor’s language in
Rumsey to claim that the Court had never departed from precedent
without “special justification.”57 Marshall’s dissent thus put O’Con-
nor’s language in the spotlight, setting the stage for a vigorous
debate over the proper scope of stare decisis in 1992’s landmark
53. 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) (citing Coronado Oil, 285 U.S. at 410 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
54. 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (“[W]hen governing decisions are unworkable or are badly
reasoned, ‘this Court has never felt constrained to follow precedent.’” (quoting Smith, 321 U.S.
at 665)).
55. 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984). “As scholars have previously acknowledged, Justice
O’Connor introduced the phrase ‘special justification’ into Court discourse in 1984’s Rumsey.”
Starger, supra note 8, at 35 (citing Emery G. Lee III, Overruling Rhetoric: The Court’s New
Approach to Stare Decisis in Constitutional Cases, 33 U. TOL. L. REV. 581 (2001)).
56. 501 U.S. at 845 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“[T]he majority declares itself free to discard
any principle of constitutional liberty which was recognized or reaffirmed over the dissenting
votes of four Justices and with which five or more Justices now disagree. The implications of
this radical new exception to the doctrine of stare decisis are staggering.”); see also Starger,
supra note 8, at 37.
57. Payne, 501 U.S. at 849 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 212);
see also Starger, supra note 8, at 37.
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Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
decision.58
Casey is, in a sense, the acme of the strong stare decisis tradition;
it created a formal list of the “special justifications” to which
Rumsey had only alluded.59 Casey’s plurality opinion suggested that,
when considering whether to overrule a precedent, the Court should
be “informed by a series of prudential and pragmatic considerations
designed to test the consistency of overruling a prior decision with
the ideal of the rule of law, and to gauge the respective costs of
reaffirming and overruling a prior case.”60 The plurality then added
a list of four considerations to weigh when contemplating overruling
a precedent:
[W]e may ask whether the rule has proven to be intolerable
simply in defying practical workability; whether the rule is
subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship
to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of
repudiation; whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have left the old rule no more than a remnant of
abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, or come
to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of
significant application or justification.61
Despite the enumeration of factors that might justify overruling
precedent under the strong stare decisis tradition, Casey also
marked an important moment in the history of the weak stare
decisis tradition. Several Justices’ opinions pointed to the poor
reasoning of a prior decision as a potential reason to overturn it.62
First, Rehnquist’s partial dissent quoted the language from Bran-
deis’s Coronado Oil dissent that suggested “the Court bows to the
lessons of experience and the force of better reasoning,” especially
in constitutional cases.63 Scalia’s partial dissent was even more
58. 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see Starger, supra note 8, at 37-38.
59. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55 (plurality opinion).
60. Id. at 854.
61. Id. at 854-55 (citations omitted).
62. See id. at 955 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 982-83
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Starger, supra note 8, at 39-40.
63. Casey, 505 U.S. at 955 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
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direct; he suggested that a proper stare decisis inquiry must ask
“how wrong was the [original] decision on its face?”64 Scalia would
later express the weak tradition again in his majority opinion in
Montejo v. Louisiana when he argued that one “relevant factor” in
determining whether to adhere to a prior decision is “whether the
decision was well reasoned.”65
By the time of Casey, then, the Justices had formally outlined the
two traditions of stare decisis. The strong tradition, embodied in the
Casey plurality opinion, seeks a special justification to overrule a
prior decision beyond the quality of a precedent’s reasoning.66 The
weak tradition, represented in Rehnquist’s67 and Scalia’s68 opinions,
would permit overruling more frequently on the grounds that poorly
reasoned decisions, especially in constitutional cases, should not
stand. As the following Part argues, that weak tradition has been
reinvigorated in recent years, culminating in the Court’s opinion in
Janus that many Justices have subsequently deployed as a new and
authoritative statement of the stare decisis doctrine.
II. JANUS ’S EMERGENCE
This Part highlights the ascendance of the weak stare decisis
tradition in recent decades, culminating in the prominent role
Janus has played in the Court’s most recent discussions of the
doctrine. It first describes how a weak stare decisis tradition has
slowly overtaken the stronger tradition in the decades since the
Court’s Casey decision. Next, this Part explains why Janus marks
a new zenith in the weak stare decisis tradition. Finally, this Part
traces the descendants of Janus, illustrating how frequently it has
been cited by Justices arguing to overturn precedent.
dissenting)).
64. Id. at 983 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
65. 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009) (“Beyond workability, the relevant factors in deciding
whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis include the antiquity of the precedent, the
reliance interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.” (citing
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234-35 (2009))).
66. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854-55 (plurality opinion).
67. Id. at 955 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
68. Id. at 982-83 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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A. The Ascendance of the Weak Stare Decisis Tradition
Though the Casey plurality opinion seemed to give permanence
to a strong stare decisis tradition, several decisions in recent
decades have chipped away at Casey’s primacy as a precedent on
precedent. One example is Justice Alito’s 2009 majority opinion in
Pearson v. Callahan.69 In that case, the Court considered whether
the two-step procedure to evaluate qualified immunity claims
announced eight years earlier in Saucier v. Katz70 should remain
mandatory.71 Justice Alito acknowledged the need to consider stare
decisis doctrine, but claimed that reversing “precedent is particu-
larly appropriate where ... a departure would not upset expecta-
tions, the precedent consists of a judge-made rule that was recently
adopted to improve the operation of the courts, and experience has
pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings.”72 Alito would later
confirm that, at least in constitutional cases, it is “appropriate” to
overrule decisions that are “badly reasoned.”73
Pearson thus supported a weak stare decisis tradition that would
overrule constitutional cases based on the fact that the substantive
decision itself was incorrect. Both Alito’s allusion to “experience
[that] has pointed up the precedent’s shortcomings” and his
reiteration that “badly reasoned” decisions are subject to reversal
show a willingness to use the substantive quality of a prior decision
as a basis to overturn it—though at the time Alito did not claim that
consideration of the substance of the prior opinion should be the
primary reason to overrule a precedent.74 Pearson also introduced
an age-based consideration in the stare decisis calculus, a theme
that would become prominent in the weak stare decisis tradition.
Alito suggested that a “rule that was recently adopted” is entitled to
less deference from the Court simply because of its relative infancy
69. 555 U.S. 223.
70. 533 U.S. 194 (2001), overruled by Pearson, 555 U.S. 223.
71. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 227.
72. Id. at 233.
73. Id. at 234 (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991)). Interestingly, though,
Alito argued that such consideration of Saucier’s reasoning was unnecessary because of the
“considerable body of new experience” showing that Saucier’s two-step rule to resolve qualified
immunity claims should be discretionary, not mandatory. Id.
74. See id. at 233-34.
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in the Court’s jurisprudence.75 He thus suggested that age might be
used as a weapon for rapid changes of course on the Court.
Justice Scalia reiterated each of those themes from Pearson in his
majority opinion in Montejo v. Louisiana.76 In Montejo, the Court
overruled Michigan v. Jackson, a twenty-three-year-old precedent
holding that a criminal defendant cannot waive his Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel and face further interrogation after the right
has attached.77 Scalia noted that “[b]eyond workability, the relevant
factors in deciding whether to adhere to the principle of stare decisis
include the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at
stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.”78
Scalia then claimed that Jackson, which was barely over two
decades old, was not entitled to deference under the “antiquity”
factor of stare decisis.79 For several pages, Scalia then railed against
the quality of Jackson’s reasoning, concluding that it created un-
necessary prophylactic protections of the right to counsel that
undermined the criminal justice system.80
Montejo re-emphasized a weak stare decisis tradition on the
Court. First, it focused upon the quality of the precedent’s reasoning
as a justification to overrule it. That consideration received the most
attention from Scalia in his stare decisis discussion, even if it was
not the first consideration that he discussed.81 Just as the Pearson
opinion suggested, Montejo used the young age of a precedent to jus-
tify a less deferential approach.82 Scalia expanded the understand-
ing of a “young” precedent slightly to claim that a decision that “is
only two decades old” can readily be reversed.83
Both the quality of reasoning and antiquity factors were again
prominent in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Citizens
United.84 In that case, the Court overruled the twenty-year-old
decision in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce that corporate
75. Id. at 233.
76. 556 U.S. 778, 792-93 (2009).
77. Id. at 797 (overruling Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986)).
78. Id. at 792-93 (quoting Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234-35).
79. Id. at 793.
80. Id. at 793-97.
81. See id. at 792-97.
82. Id. at 793.
83. Id.
84. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 362-63 (2010).
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entities could not spend money from their general treasury to
independently advocate for the election or defeat of a political
candidate.85 Borrowing language from Montejo, Kennedy explained
that the stare decisis doctrine analyzed a precedent’s “workability,
... the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance interests at stake, and
of course whether the decision was well reasoned.”86 Kennedy then
focused his analysis upon the quality of Austin’s reasoning,
discussing it before other stare decisis factors.87 In ultimately calling
to overrule Austin, Kennedy emphasized that stare decisis is “not a
mechanical formula of adherence to the latest decision.”88
Citizens United was another brick in the foundation of the weak
stare decisis tradition. It placed primary emphasis upon the quality
of the precedent’s reasoning as a ground to overturn it. That became
not only the most discussed component of stare decisis analysis, but
the initial, and most detailed, point of discussion.89 Citizens United
also re-emphasized that decisions of recent vintage are entitled to
less deference from the Court. As an added basis for overturning the
twenty-year-old Austin, Kennedy noted that stare decisis does not
require as much adherence to recent decisions.90
B. Janus: The Strongest Expression of the Weak Stare Decisis
Tradition
The trend towards a weak stare decisis tradition culminated in
Janus.91 Justice Alito’s Janus opinion, itself the product of a years-
long effort to undermine the holding in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education,92 reaffirmed that poor reasoning in a prior decision is
85. Id. at 365 (overruling Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Com., 494 U.S. 652 (1990)).
86. Id. at 362-63 (quoting Montejo, 556 U.S. at 792-93). Kennedy’s opinion also noted that
in Pearson v. Callahan, the Court “examined whether ‘experience has pointed up the
precedent’s shortcomings.’” Id. at 363 (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009)).
87. Id. at 363-64.
88. Id. at 363 (emphasis added) (quoting Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940)).
89. See id. at 362-63.
90. See id. at 363.
91. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478-
79 (2018).
92. 431 U.S. 209 (1977), overruled by Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448.
102 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:083
grounds to overturn it and that the age of a precedent affects its
deferential weight.93
Alito acknowledged that prior discussions of stare decisis listed
several “factors” to consider when overruling a precedent.94 Alito’s
formulation, however, stated that “the quality of [the precedent’s]
reasoning” is the very first consideration for Justices unsatisfied
with an earlier decision.95 Alito then relied heavily on that consider-
ation, deriding the quality of Abood’s reasoning for several pages.96
The poor quality of Abood’s reasoning was thus Alito’s primary
ground for overruling it.
Alito’s analysis then turned to Abood’s workability, factual and
legal underpinnings, and failure to generate reliance interests.97
But, in each of those discussions, the focus was again on the
substantive incorrectness of Abood. Alito’s discussion of workability
highlighted the blurriness of the line between chargeable and non-
chargeable union expenditures—a substantive complaint about
Abood’s approach.98 Scholars have noted that a decision’s workabi-
lity is not measured by the nuance of its test, but by whether it
“cannot be logically applied,” even by its supporters,99 such that
courts and litigants cannot “understand ... [the] rule without undue
difficulty.”100 The claim that Abood required subtle line-drawing—
without further evidence that courts or litigants favoring Abood had
difficulty applying it—was actually a complaint about Abood’s
93. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478, 2486. Alito presaged the decision to overrule Abood in
several earlier opinions. In 2012, he wrote for the majority in Knox v. Service Employees
International Union, Local 1000, warning that Abood’s holding was “something of an
anomaly.” 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012). In 2014, Alito authored Harris v. Quinn, in which he
suggested in dicta that Abood was incorrectly decided because the First Amendment should
prohibit fair-share fees in public sector unions. 573 U.S. 616, 633-38 (2014). While some have
critiqued Alito’s effort to overrule Abood, see Kate Andrias, Janus’s Two Faces, 2018 SUP. CT.
REV. 21, 26, 51, others have defended it as an effort to give defenders of Abood “one last
chance” to argue for its preservation and to signal to those relying on Abood’s rule that change
was likely coming, see Richard M. Re, Second Thoughts on “One Last Chance”?, 66 UCLA L.
REV. 634, 636-42 (2019).
94. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478.
95. Id. at 2478-79.
96. Id. at 2479-81.
97. Id. at 2481-86.
98. See id. at 2481-82.
99. Mary Ziegler, Taming Unworkability Doctrine: Rethinking Stare Decisis, 50 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1215, 1254 (2018).
100. See KOZEL, supra note 16, at 110.
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substantive accuracy.101 When Alito turned to the factual and legal
underpinnings of Abood, he again derided its substance, noting that
his own prior opinions had decried Abood as “an ‘anomaly’ in our
First Amendment jurisprudence.”102 When Alito turned to the lack
of reliance on Abood, he again critiqued Abood’s substance. First,
Alito suggested that Abood was so substantively flawed that it could
not generate reasonable reliance.103 Alito then reiterated that his
own prior opinions, which suggested that Abood was substantively
incorrect, gave notice to contracting parties that it would likely be
overruled.104
Janus thus contained a more extreme version of the weak stare
decisis tradition found in Pearson, Montejo, and Citizens United. It
did not merely claim that “poor reasoning” in a precedent is grounds
for overruling it, as Pearson and Montejo suggested.105 Nor did it
merely focus upon that poor reasoning as a primary ground for
overruling, as had the majority in Citizens United.106 Janus went
further. By discussing “the quality of Abood’s reasoning” in depth
and before the other factors, Janus strongly suggested that a
precedent’s reasoning should be the primary discussion point when
determining whether to overrule a prior decision.107 It then allowed
that consideration to consume the discussion of other “special
justifications” from the strong stare decisis tradition.108 Janus thus
overturned a prior decision solely based upon the Justices’ substan-
tive disagreement with its reasoning.
Janus also re-emphasized the weak tradition’s claim that the
age of a precedent is an important factor in the stare decisis
analysis, but this time with a twist. In Janus, Alito avoided a direct
citation to Montejo’s “antiquity” language, which posited that recent
101. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2481-82.
102. See id. at 2483 (first quoting Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. 616, 627 (2014); and then
quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Loc. 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 311 (2012)).
103. See id. at 2484 (“Abood does not provide ‘a clear or easily applicable standard, so
arguments for reliance based on its clarity are misplaced.’” (quoting South Dakota v. Wayfair,
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2098 (2018))).
104. See id. at 2484-85 (discussing multiple cases that the opinion argued should have
placed public unions on notice of the Court’s skepticism of Abood’s future).
105. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 234 (2009); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778,
793 (2009).
106. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 363-64 (2010).
107. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478-81.
108. See id. at 2481-86.
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decisions are entitled to less deference.109 Instead, Alito argued that
some older decisions that are substantively incorrect—especially
those that have been violating citizens’ constitutional rights
throughout their tenure—are entitled to less deference.110 According
to Alito, the forty-one-year-old decision in Abood had taken “billions
of dollars” from nonunion members in violation of their First
Amendment rights, a constitutional injustice that “cannot be
allowed to continue indefinitely.”111 Additionally, because older
decisions like Abood may have been judicially criticized over their
long life span, rational actors have likely disregarded them, weak-
ening the precedent’s value.112 Abood was subject to repeated
criticism from the Court—most prominently from Alito himself113—
and thus “public-sector unions ha[d] been on notice for years
regarding this Court’s misgivings about Abood.”114
Janus thus re-emphasized that the age of a precedent is an
important stare decisis consideration, but this time with a sugges-
tion that Justices accord less deference to some older decisions that
have worked a substantive injustice.115 Following Janus, then, the
age of a precedent is a double-edged sword in the weak stare decisis
tradition. First, younger decisions are entitled to less deference, as
Pearson and Montejo emphasized.116 Second, following Janus, older
decisions that are poorly reasoned are likewise entitled to less
deference.117 Because an incorrect precedent has been on the books
for decades or centuries, it is both likely to have been criticized by
commentators or judges and may have worked a substantive
injustice upon citizens for an intolerable period of time.
109. Compare Montejo, 556 U.S. at 792-93, with Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
110. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 2484-85.
113. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
114. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484. “During this period of time, any public-sector union
seeking an agency-fee provision in a collective-bargaining agreement must have understood
that the constitutionality of such a provision was uncertain.” Id. at 2485.
115. See id. at 2486.
116. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778,
792-93 (2009). The lack of respect towards younger precedents has been tempered somewhat
by the Court’s decision, and Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis, in June Medical Services L.L.C.
v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2141-42 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
117. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2486.
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C. Janus’s Descendants
Because Janus presented an especially weak form of stare decisis,
Justices interested in overruling a precedent have relied upon its
wording to justify changes in course. When the Supreme Court has
cited to Janus, it has almost always been in opinions that advocated
overruling a precedent. As of August 2020, the Court has cited
Janus in ten cases.118 Subtracting two citations to remand compan-
ion cases to Janus,119 one citation in a dissent from the denial of
certiorari to note that Janus had in fact overruled Abood,120 and one
passing citation to the Janus dissent,121 the majority opinion has
been cited in six cases.
In the 2018 Term, the Court cited Janus’s stare decisis discussion
in two cases in which it struck down precedents that were roughly
forty years old.122 First, in Franchise Tax Board of California v.
Hyatt, the Court cited the Janus formulation of stare decisis while
overruling a forty-year-old precedent, Nevada v. Hall.123 Justice
Thomas’s majority opinion cited the Janus formulation to empha-
size the quality of the precedent’s reasoning as a factor that can
favor overruling.124 Thomas then quickly noted that Hall was poor-
ly reasoned, as it “failed to account for the historical understanding
of state sovereign immunity and ... failed to consider how the
deprivation of traditional diplomatic tools reordered the States’
118. See June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 2151
(Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at 2170-71 (Alito, J., dissenting); Jarchow v. State Bar of Wis.,
140 S. Ct. 1720, 1720 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390,
1409 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 1411, 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. at
1439 (Alito, J., dissenting); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2445, 2447 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring); Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2304 (2019) (Breyer, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019); Gamble v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 2006 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca. v.
Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019); Fleck v. Wetch, 139 S. Ct. 590, 590 (2018); Riffey v.
Rauner, 138 S. Ct. 2708, 2708-09 (2018).
119. See Fleck, 139 S. Ct. at 590; Riffey, 138 S. Ct. at 2708-09.
120. See Jarchow, 140 S. Ct. at 1720 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
121. See Iancu, 139 S. Ct. at 2304 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
122. See Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2178; Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca., 139 S. Ct. at 1499.
123. See Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca., 139 S. Ct. at 1499 (citing Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State,
Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478-79 (2018), in support of overruling
Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)).
124. Id.
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relationships with one another.”125 After quickly adding that Hall
was an outlier in the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence and
engendered only “case-specific” reliance interests for the parties
before the Court, rather than in the general public, it formally
overruled that decision.126
That cursory examination of stare decisis drew heated criticism
from Justice Breyer in dissent.127 According to Breyer, the majority’s
bare belief that Hall was wrong should not justify overruling it; an
argument that a precedent was incorrect does not by itself justify
reversal, especially when the dissenting Justices in the original case
even considered the majority’s holding “plausible.”128 After disagree-
ing that the law or the understanding of state sovereign immunity
had changed since Hall was decided, Breyer argued that the reli-
ance of all citizens upon the Court’s respect for precedent was at
stake in the case.129 Overruling cases “produces increased uncer-
tainty,” with negative consequences including increased challenges
to settled law and a public that is “uncertain about which cases the
Court will overrule and which cases are here to stay.”130 Noting the
danger of “overrul[ing] a decision only because five Members of a
later Court come to agree with earlier dissenters on a difficult legal
question,” Breyer warned that the “decision can only cause one to
wonder which cases the Court will overrule next.”131
An answer to Breyer’s inquiry would come just months later in
Knick v. Township of Scott, in which a majority led by Chief Justice
Roberts again relied upon Janus’s formulation of stare decisis to
overrule a precedent in its fourth decade.132 Knick overruled
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank of Johnson City, a 1985 case that suggested there was no
taking from a property owner, and thus no Fifth Amendment claim
in federal court, until a state court has denied the owner’s claim for
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1504-05 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1505 (quoting Hall, 440 U.S. at 427).
129. Id. at 1505-06.
130. Id. at 1506.
131. Id.
132. Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178-79 (2019) (citing Janus v. Am. Fed’n of
State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478 (2018)).
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just compensation under state law.133 Roberts emphasized, however,
that in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County of San Francisco,
a previous Takings Clause case, the Court held that a state court’s
resolution of a claim for just compensation has preclusive effect in
a subsequent federal suit, which had the practical effect of preclud-
ing any federal takings claim.134 Roberts thus found Williamson
County’s reasoning unsound, a point he emphasized by again
reciting the Janus formulation of stare decisis that places poor
reasoning at the start of the analysis.135 Because Williamson
County’s reasoning “was not just wrong” but “was exceptionally ill
founded and conflicted with much of [the Court’s] takings jurispru-
dence,” the time had come to overrule it.136
Justice Kagan’s Knick dissent emphasized Janus’s flawed
formulation of stare decisis that puts the quality of the precedent’s
reasoning at the start of any discussion about overruling. For
Kagan, “it is not enough that five Justices believe a precedent
wrong.”137 Kagan also questioned the majority’s claim that William-
son County could be overruled because it did not generate reliance
interests, arguing that such interests “are a plus-factor in the
doctrine; when they exist, stare decisis becomes ‘superpowered.’”138
Kagan noted that Breyer’s question about which cases the Court
would overrule next “didn’t take long” to answer.139 Justice Kagan
then added, “Now one may wonder yet again.”140
Twice in the 2018 Term, Justice Gorsuch cited Janus’s discussion
of stare decisis to argue that a precedent should have been struck
133. Williamson Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172
(1985), overruled by Knick, 139 S. Ct. 2162.
134. Knick, 139 S. Ct. at 2167 (citing San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cnty. of San Fran-
cisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005)).
135. Id. at 2178 (“We have identified several factors to consider in deciding whether to
overrule a past decision, including ‘the quality of [its] reasoning, the workability of the rule
it established, its consistency with other related decisions, ... and reliance on the decision.’”
(alteration and omission in original) (quoting Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478-79)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2189 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 2190 (quoting Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 458 (2015)).
139. Id. (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1506 (2019) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting)).
140. Id.
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down.141 First, in Kisor v. Wilkie, Justice Gorsuch cited to Janus’s
formulation of the grounds for departing from stare decisis in a
concurrence calling for the Court to overrule Auer v. Robbins.142
Gorsuch wrote that the factors enumerated in Janus, which again
started with the quality of the precedent’s reasoning, have been
fashioned “over time” as the Court “[r]ecogniz[ed] the need for
balance” between the need for legal change and stare decisis.143
Using this formulation, Gorsuch first emphasized the flaws in
Auer’s reasoning as his initial argument against retaining that
precedent.144
Just two weeks earlier, Gorsuch filed a dissenting opinion that
seized upon the same language while arguing to overrule an
opinion. In Gamble v. United States, Gorsuch’s dissent suggested
that the Court’s separate sovereigns doctrine, encapsulated in a
series of opinions over the past two centuries, should be overruled.145
This time, Gorsuch began by quoting from the list of factors from
the majority in Hyatt.146 Once again, the first factor he analyzed was
the quality of the precedent’s reasoning, this time with a citation to
Janus.147
In 2020’s Ramos v. Louisiana, three Justices cited Janus in
discussions of stare decisis that broadly perpetuated the weak stare
decisis tradition.148 The case concerned Louisiana’s practice per-
mitting criminal convictions obtained through nonunanimous jury
verdicts. A series of fractured opinions in 1972’s Apodaca v.
Oregon149 and Johnson v. Louisiana150 upheld that practice, with the
key vote coming from Justice Powell’s view that, although the Sixth
141. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2445, 2447 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Gamble
v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1963, 2006 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
142. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425, 2445 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (discussing Auer v. Robbins,
519 U.S. 452 (1997)).
143. Id. at 2445.
144. Id.
145. 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1996 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 2006 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019)).
147. Id. (citing Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct.
2448, 2479 (2018)).
148. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1409 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at
1411, 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); id. at 1439 (Alito, J., dissenting).
149. 406 U.S. 404 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390.
150. 406 U.S. 356 (1972), abrogated by Ramos, 140 S. Ct. 1390.
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Amendment required unanimity, it was not fully applicable against
the states.151
In Ramos, the Court reconsidered Apodaca and held that the
Sixth Amendment, as incorporated against the states, requires that
a jury find a criminal defendant guilty by a unanimous verdict.152
Writing for the Court, Justice Gorsuch first suggested that Apodaca
was so fractured that it did not “suppl[y] a governing precedent” at
all.153 But Gorsuch added an argument that, even if Apodaca were
precedential, stare decisis would not prevent overruling it.154
Gorsuch quoted the weak version of stare decisis from Franchise
Tax Board of California v. Hyatt—which in turn relied upon the
formulation in Janus—and emphasized that the quality of a
decision’s reasoning is the primary consideration within stare
decisis analysis, calling Apodaca’s reasoning “gravely mistaken.”155
In concurring opinions, Justices Kavanaugh and Sotomayor cited
Janus as direct support for either ignoring or overruling Apodaca.
Justice Sotomayor cited Janus in noting that “the Court has
recently overruled precedent where the Court’s shift threatened vast
regulatory and economic consequences.”156 She argued that discard-
ing Apodaca as a precedent would cause far less societal upheaval,
explaining that “were this Court to take the dissent’s approach—
defending criminal-procedure opinions as wrong as Apodaca simply
to avoid burdening criminal justice systems—it would never correct
its criminal jurisprudence at all.”157 Though Sotomayor implicitly
opposed overruling a “precedent ‘simply because a majority of this
Court now disagrees with’ it,” her opinion citing Janus nonetheless
counseled in favor of overruling precedent.158
151. Id. at 371 (Powell, J., concurring).
152. Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1397.
153. Id. at 1402. For a discussion of this claim that Apodaca was really no precedent at all,
see Michael Gentithes, Phantom Precedents in Ramos v. Louisiana, APP. ADVOC. BLOG (Apr.
22, 2020), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/appellate_advocacy/2020/04/phantom-precedents-
in-ramos-v-louisiana.html [https://perma.cc/LC97-V3XY].
154. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1404-05.
155. Id. at 1405 (citing Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499 (2019)).
156. Id. at 1409 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., &
Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)).
157. Id. at 1409-10.
158. See id. at 1409 (first quoting Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 133 (2013) (Alito,
J., dissenting); and then citing Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448).
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Justice Kavanaugh cited Janus in his concurring opinion to
suggest that he would likewise make the quality of a precedent’s
reasoning the primary stare decisis consideration.159 Citing Janus,
Kavanaugh noted, “[I]n just the last few Terms, every current Mem-
ber of this Court has voted to overrule multiple constitutional
precedents.”160 He claimed that overruling a precedent “always re-
quires ‘reasons that go beyond mere demonstration that the over-
ruled opinion was wrong.’”161 However, when Kavanaugh catalogued
the stare decisis factors the Court had previously identified, he
placed “the quality of the precedent’s reasoning” at the top of the
list.162 Kavanaugh then suggested that the Court’s first consider-
ation when possibly overruling a precedent should be whether it
was “grievously or egregiously wrong,” yet another allusion to the
quality of its reasoning.163 When Kavanaugh then argued to overrule
Apodaca, his first point was how “egregiously wrong” that decision
was.164
Even Ramos’s three-Justice dissent made its argument in defense
of precedent on the weak stare decisis tradition’s terms. The
dissent—an unexpected alignment of Justices Alito, Roberts, and
Kagan—argued that Apodaca was not nearly as poorly reasoned as
the majority would have it, but it was silent on whether such poor
reasoning should be a reason to overrule a case on its own.165 The
dissent’s apparent acceptance of poor reasoning as the first factor in
stare decisis analysis was especially alarming given Kagan’s vig-
orous opposition to that factor just a year earlier in Knick.166
159. See id. at 1414 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (suggesting that the first factor in stare
decisis analysis is whether the precedent is “grievously or egregiously wrong”).
160. Id. at 1411.
161. Id. at 1414 (quoting Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1416. In a separate concurring opinion that did not directly cite Janus, Justice
Thomas argued that “demonstrably erroneous” decisions like Apodaca must be overturned
irrespective of any practical stare decisis considerations. See id. at 1421 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (citing Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1981 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)).
165. See id. at 1425, 1432-36 (Alito, J., dissenting).
166. See Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2189-90 (2019) (Kagan, J., dissenting). The
Ramos dissent did directly cite Janus in its discussion, but only to claim that the reliance
interests at stake in Janus were lesser than those at stake in Ramos. 140 S. Ct. at 1439 (2020)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (citing Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31,
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Finally, the Court’s 2020 decision in June Medical Services L.L.C.
v. Russo continued the trend of supporting Janus’s weak stare
decisis formulation, with three Justices citing it and two arguing to
overrule a recent precedent.167 The case concerned a Louisiana
statute requiring abortion providers to hold admitting privileges
within thirty miles of the abortion clinic—just like a Texas statute
that the Court struck down only four years before in Whole Woman’s
Health v. Hellerstedt.168 Stare decisis was thus front and center to
the Court’s decision.
Two dissenting Justices cited Janus while arguing to overrule
Whole Woman’s Health. First, Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion
claimed that a precedent should be overruled when it is “demonstra-
bly erroneous,” a clear reference to the quality of that precedent’s
reasoning.169 Thomas then cited Janus (along with Knick and Hyatt)
to note that the Court “recently overruled a number of poorly
reasoned precedents that have proved themselves to be unwork-
able.”170 In so doing, Thomas reiterated the weak stare decisis
tradition’s emphasis on poor reasoning, seemingly mixing it with a
potentially distinct stare decisis factor of unworkability. 
Justice Alito’s dissent likewise relied upon Janus’s formulation of
the weak stare decisis tradition. Alito first claimed that stare decisis
requires the Court to “consider factors beyond the strength of the
precedent’s reasoning.”171 But he went on to claim, with citations to
Janus and Hyatt, that “[r]eexamination of a precedent may be
appropriate when it is an ‘outlier’ and its reasoning cannot be
reconciled with other established precedents”—again focusing his
stare decisis discussion first on the quality of a precedent’s rea-
soning.172
138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)).
167. 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); id. at 2151 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2170-71 (Alito, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2112 (plurality opinion) (citing Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct.
2292, 2300 (2016)).
169. Id. at 2151 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960,
1985 (2019)).
170. Id. at 2151-52 (first citing Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162 (2019); then citing
Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485 (2019); and then citing Janus, 138 S. Ct.
2448).
171. Id. at 2170 (Alito, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (first citing Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485; and then citing Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448). Alito
again cited Janus when arguing that there were also insufficient reliance interests on Whole
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June Medical Services was different, of course, because Chief
Justice Roberts’s controlling concurrence relied upon stare decisis
to uphold a precedent.173 Roberts’s opinion broadly supported the
strong stare decisis tradition—a clear outlier amongst Janus’s
descendants. Roberts noted that stare decisis is grounded in a
judicial humility that recognizes the similarity between past and
present cases; he then noted the doctrine’s many practical
benefits.174 He added that overruling a previous case must be
justified by some rationale beyond the precedent’s substantive
incorrectness.175 Roberts cited Janus to list several stare decisis
factors, but he noticeably excluded the quality of a precedent’s
reasoning—the very first factor in Janus—from the list.176 Though
Roberts alluded to the quality of a precedent’s reasoning when
noting that it is sometimes better to “remain[ ] true to an ‘intrinsi-
cally sounder’ doctrine established in prior cases” rather than
following a “recent departure”—and later spent several pages
deriding the balancing test that was central to Whole Woman’s
Health—he ultimately followed that four-year-old precedent on
stare decisis grounds.177
* * * 
This Section has shown that nearly every opinion citing Janus
has utilized its extremely weak stare decisis formulation to argue
for overruling a precedent. Though there are hopeful outliers, such
as Chief Justice Roberts’s June Medical Services opinion, this
Section illustrates that Janus is quickly developing into a preferred
precedent on precedents when Justices want to overrule a prior
decision. It is a new statement of the doctrine of stare decisis that
must be taken seriously, one which both changes prior doctrine in
the area and suggests that those changes are normatively desirable.
Woman’s Health to justify upholding it. Id. at 2171 (first citing Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485; and
then citing Janus, 138 S. Ct. 2448).
173. Id. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
174. Id. For further discussion of the importance of judicial humility, see Michael
Gentithes, Precedent, Humility, and Justice, 18 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 835, 868-69 (2012).
175. June Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
176. See id. (citing Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2478-79).
177. Id. (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231 (1995) (plurality
opinion)).
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Responding to Janus thus requires considering whether the stare
decisis factors it deploys are normatively desirable.178
III. POORLY REASONED JUSTIFICATIONS
As noted above, the Janus majority began its discussion of stare
decisis by focusing on the poor quality of reasoning in Abood.179
Janus listed the quality of the precedent’s reasoning as the first
consideration when deciding whether to overrule a case, then
focused upon it throughout its stare decisis discussion, even when
mentioning other “special justification[s]” found in the strong stare
decisis tradition.180 As this Part discusses, that elevation of poor rea-
soning within the stare decisis analysis is a dangerous error. This
Part will first show how this confuses a condition precedent to stare
decisis analysis with the conditions that are sufficient for overruling
prior decisions. This Part will then demonstrate how efforts to
create a “demonstrable error” criterion for overruling inevitably
base their decisions to overrule on the quality of a precedent’s
reasoning, duplicating the confusion over conditions precedent in
178. One might also consider whether Janus meets the standards necessary to change the
Court’s precedent on precedents, whatever those might be. Randy Kozel helpfully notes that
such standards are hard to come by:
Stare decisis is a doctrine in the sense that it consists of several oft-recited
considerations designed to shed light on a particular issue. But like the rules of
constitutional interpretation, the rules of precedent are wide-ranging. They
apply to thousands of cases dealing with all manner of fact, law, and procedural
posture. They often have only the slimmest connection to particular disputes,
operating instead at high levels of generality. The rules of stare decisis are thus
best understood as residing outside a precedent’s scope of applicability in future
disputes.
See KOZEL, supra note 16, at 172. Stare decisis is more a guiding principle than a guiding
decision to be overruled in one fell swoop. The doctrine has become so abused and malleable
over the years that its exact contours are a matter of debate, as the competing “weak” and
“strong” traditions well demonstrate. See Starger, supra note 8, at 44 (“The widespread
inconsistency of Justices towards the proper stare decisis test suggests that the Court’s
‘precedent about precedent’ itself has little precedential value. From one case to the next, a
single Justice may analyze overruling questions using different stare decisis tests. Whether
the test advocated is weak or strong depends almost entirely on the result being justified.”).
There is no singular precedent on precedents, but instead a series of decisions that discuss
the value of aligning future decisions with those of the past. Given that malleability, it is all
the more critical to examine new trends in the direction of the doctrine—as Janus itself
certainly is—before they become entrenched.
179. See Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2479.
180. See id. at 2478-86 (alteration in original).
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the Janus formulation. Finally, this Part will illustrate the dan-
gerous consequences of following a weak stare decisis tradition
that elevates poor reasoning as Janus has.
A. Poor Reasoning as a Condition Precedent to Stare Decisis
Discussion
Analysis of the quality of a precedent’s reasoning—the corner-
stone of the weak stare decisis tradition—is not a component of the
stare decisis analysis in the strong tradition. Instead, it is a
condition precedent to that analysis. Justice Stevens’s partial
dissent in Citizens United highlights this distinction.181 For Stevens,
the majority’s claim that the precedent at issue was poorly reasoned
represented “the Court’s merits argument, ... and restating a merits
argument with additional vigor does not give it extra weight in the
stare decisis calculus.”182 Stevens contended that stare decisis should
not allow reversal based upon “nothing more than ... disagreement
with [a precedent’s] results.”183 Instead, for stare decisis “to do any
meaningful work in supporting the rule of law, it must at least
demand a significant justification, beyond the preferences of five
Justices, for overturning settled doctrine.”184 Chief Justice Roberts
recently echoed this view in his June Medical Services concurrence,
noting that “for precedent to mean anything, the doctrine [of stare
decisis] must give way only to a rationale that goes beyond whether
the case was decided correctly.”185
These opinions highlight the appropriate role of a Justice’s dis-
agreement with a precedent in stare decisis analysis. Poor reasoning
in a decision motivates a Justice to think about overruling that
decision; it triggers stare decisis analysis of the costs and benefits
181. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 408-09 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
182. Id. at 409.
183. Id. at 414; see also Deborah Hellman, The Importance of Appearing Principled, 37
ARIZ. L. REV. 1107, 1120 n.75 (1995) (“To permit overruling where the overruling court finds
only that the prior court’s decision is wrong is to accord the prior decision only persuasive
force.”).
184. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
185. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
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of overruling a previous case.186 But Janus’s version of the weak
stare decisis tradition enlists “poor reasoning” for double duty. In
that version, “poor reasoning” is both a condition precedent for stare
decisis doctrine and a sufficient condition to overrule Court
precedents.
Poor reasoning in a precedent cannot serve both functions. The
only motivation for a current Justice to consider stare decisis at all
is her belief that a prior Justice’s work was substantively incorrect.
That belief is one Justices frequently reach in subsequent cases
“[b]ecause it is not hard for intelligent Justices (particularly if they
share strong views about how the Constitution should be inter-
preted) to find some fault with a constitutional precedent.”187 It is
easy for Justices to disagree with the reasoning of a decision and
label it poor, so if that disagreement and labeling also stand as
grounds to overrule precedent, Justices can readily reverse nearly
any precedent.188
Defenders of the weak stare decisis tradition might respond that
stare decisis is triggered by disagreement with the decision’s
results, not its reasoning. Put another way, the condition precedent
for a stare decisis discussion is a poor outcome, not necessarily poor
reasoning. Once that initial hurdle is met, the argument goes, then
the quality of the reasoning that led to it can be analyzed as a
practical factor that may or may not favor overruling the prior
decision.
But this analytical distinction between outcomes and reasoning
collapses upon itself. To begin, the distinction between poor
outcomes and poor reasoning is razor-thin; the two categories
nearly, if not entirely, overlap. To the extent there is some space
between the two concepts, there is no method through which
Justices might identify a poor outcome other than to utilize the very
same tools they employ to determine whether the reasoning that led
186. Larry Alexander, Did Casey Strike Out?, in PRECEDENT IN THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT, supra note 8, at 47, 49 (“One necessary condition for overruling an erroneous
interpretive precedent is that the interpretation of the Constitution that the precedent
declares is now believed to be erroneous. That much is obvious once one accepts that one’s
belief in the infelicity of the Constitution, correctly interpreted, is itself not a sufficient
condition for departing from it.”).
187. Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and
Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 113 (1991).
188. See id.
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to the poor outcome was likewise poor. A Justice cannot come to
disagree with the outcome of a case unless she has applied her own
interpretive methodologies to the problem—thereby reasoning her
way through the issues—and has determined that the outcome was
wrong. Disagreements about outcome thus dissolve into disagree-
ments about interpretation and, by extension, reasoning. Thus, the
claim that stare decisis can be triggered by mere disagreement with
outcomes dissolves into a claim that stare decisis should be
triggered by disagreement with a precedent’s reasoning; that
disagreement about reasoning necessarily exists each time a Justice
disagrees with the precedent’s outcome.
Defenders of a weak stare decisis tradition might also contend
that the strong tradition’s allusion to practical justifications for
overruling prior decisions are merely aspirational. As an empirical
matter, “[o]verrulings of precedent rarely occur without a change in
the Court’s personnel.”189 When the Court does overrule a prior case,
it often alludes to the fact that the precedent was “[w]rong the day
it was decided,” an allusion to poor reasoning that often permeates
more objective factors such as doctrinal erosion or changed facts.190
Such arguments for a weak version of stare decisis are really ar-
guments against any stare decisis doctrine at all.191 If stare decisis
does anything, it at least occasionally constrains Justices from over-
turning a case with which they disagree. To perform even that
minimal function, it must appeal to some objective criteria beyond
individual Justices’ interpretive methodologies, and those criteria
must be ones upon which the Justices can agree.192 Otherwise, stare
decisis will never truly constrain any Justice.
Disagreement over the proper reasoning in precedents is rampant
on the Court and unlikely to subside anytime soon.193 To say that a
189. South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
190. L.A. Powe, Jr., Intragenerational Constitutional Overruling, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
2093, 2112 (2014).
191. See JOHN A. JENKINS, THE PARTISAN: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM REHNQUIST 250 (2012)
(quoting Chief Justice Rehnquist’s claim that “stare decisis in constitutional law is pretty
much of a sham”).
192. See KOZEL, supra note 16, at 103.
193. Writing nearly three decades ago, Michael Gerhardt acknowledged this lack of
interpretive agreement and the unlikelihood that consensus on matters of interpretation
would be reached anytime soon:
Given the current Court's lack of ideological balance, it probably would be some
time before a majority of the Justices even acknowledged that any argument
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decision can be overturned if it was “wrong when decided” or was
“poorly reasoned” is to say nothing more than that a decision can be
overturned if a Justice thinks it is substantively incorrect. Because
there is no consensus on the Court about what qualifies as a
substantively incorrect decision, there cannot be consensus about
when to overrule cases under the weak stare decisis tradition.194
I am not suggesting that one constitutional interpretive method-
ology is superior, or that the Justices should agree on the outcome
of cases more frequently. In fact, one reason to respect prior
decisions is the accumulated wisdom those decisions represent.195
Precedents have settled on answers to difficult questions through
the adjudicative process, which required many legal thinkers to
consider the question from contrasting viewpoints before reaching
a resolution.196 The very fact that such contrasting viewpoints exist
demonstrates the lack of emerging consensus as to interpretive
methodology and hence as to the substantive accuracy of prior
decisions. Settlement achieved under those conditions is something
to be celebrated and preserved, not perpetually revisited. Such
settlement under trying conditions is at the core of stare decisis’s
purpose. Stare decisis’s value lies in its ability to settle disputes
independent of the Justices’ views about the substantive correctness
of a decision, or about the proper method to achieve substantively
except for one supporting their conservative viewpoint on a constitutional issue
was persuasive or that the reasoning of some prior decision is wrong but
respectable enough for them to leave it alone.
Gerhardt, supra note 187, at 113 (footnote omitted).
194. See, e.g., KOZEL, supra note 16, at 102 (“By tethering a decision’s continued vitality
to the perceived gravity of its offenses—a perception that will vary from [J]ustice to
[J]ustice—the prevailing approach to stare decisis robs precedents of independent value
beyond their attractiveness on the merits.”).
195. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring) (citing 3 EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 110
(1790)).
196. See, e.g., DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 41 (2010) (“It is a bad idea to
try to resolve a problem on your own, without referring to the collective wisdom of other
people who have tried to solve the same problem. That is why it makes sense to follow
precedent, especially if the precedents are clear and have been established for a long time.”);
William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1, 44-45 (2019) (“Adherence to
tradition is said to respect the ‘accumulated wisdom of many generations’ and to ‘reflect a
kind of rough empiricism.’” (quoting David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation, 63 U.CHI.L.REV. 877, 891-92 (1996))); see also, e.g., Gentithes, supra note 174,
at 868; Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism, 105 MICH. L. REV. 353, 370-72 (2006).
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correct results.197 Because they are unlikely to agree about what
should have been the substantively correct decision, the Justices
lack any agreed-upon criteria by which to evaluate whether the
quality of a precedent’s reasoning is “wrong enough” to merit
overruling. If each Justice simply applies their own criteria, based
upon their own interpretive methodologies, and thus overrules all
decisions that fail to meet that standard whenever possible, stare
decisis will lack the constraining power to settle disputes irrespec-
tive of interpretive methods.
B. Demonstrable Error and Stare Decisis
Some Justices have suggested that constitutional decisions should
be overturned when they are “grievously”198 or “demonstrably”199
wrong. For instance, in a concurring opinion in 2019’s Gamble v.
United States, Justice Thomas argued against the use of stare
decisis in many constitutional cases. For Thomas, exercise of Article
III’s “judicial [p]ower” requires the Court to “‘liquidat[e]’ ... the
meaning of the law.”200 Stare decisis, on the other hand, is derived
from the English common law tradition, not our constitutional
order.201 Given the different role of federal courts in the American
system, Thomas argued that “if the Court encounters a decision that
is demonstrably erroneous—i.e., one that is not a permissible inter-
pretation of the text—the Court should correct the error, regardless
of whether other factors support overruling the precedent.”202 Only
197. See KOZEL, supra note 16, at 61.
198. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Justice
Kavanaugh also used this language to explain when he would overrule a precedent during his
confirmation hearings. For Kavanaugh, the factors in stare decisis include “whether the
decision’s not just wrong but grievously wrong. Whether it's inconsistent with the law that's
grown up around it, ... what the real-world consequences are, including workability, and then
reliance.” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Brett M. Kavanaugh to be an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2018) (response of Judge Brett M. Kavanaugh to questioning by Sen.
Ben Sasse) (emphasis added).
199. Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring); June
Med. Servs. L.L.C., 140 S. Ct. at 2151 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
200. Gamble, 139 S. Ct. at 1982 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 467-68 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1984.
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by reversing course from such “demonstrably erroneous” cases can
the Court ensure “the Constitution’s supremacy over other sources
of law—including our own precedents,” thereby avoiding the
temptation to make, rather than interpret, the law.203
Justice Kavanaugh raised similar points in his opinion in Ramos
v. Louisiana. In that case, Kavanaugh catalogued the stare decisis
factors the Court had previously identified, listing “the quality of
the precedent’s reasoning” first.204 Kavanaugh then suggested that
the Court’s first consideration when possibly overruling a precedent
should be whether it was “grievously or egregiously wrong.”205
These opinions echoed Professor Caleb Nelson’s argument about
overruling “demonstrably erroneous” precedents.206 Nelson pre-
scribed a weaker form of stare decisis that “would begin by asking
whether the past decision reflects a permissible or an impermissible
view of the underlying law.”207 Only “permissible” interpretations
would be presumptively affirmed, even though the current Court
disagrees with them, “unless there is some practical reason for
overruling”—an apparent reference to the typical factors in the
strong stare decisis tradition, such as workability and reliance.208 In
contrast, impermissible, “demonstrably erroneous” interpretations
would enjoy no such presumption; those precedents should be
overruled, unless there are practical reasons to uphold them.209
Nelson’s thoughtful position seems to suggest, much as I have
earlier,210 that a current Justice’s belief that a prior decision was
poorly reasoned typically is not grounds to overrule it, but rather is
a condition precedent that triggers stare decisis analysis.211 So long
as the prior Supreme Court decision is a permissible view of the
substantive law—which seems extremely likely given the Court’s
expertise, the percolation of the issue in the lower courts, and the
quality of arguments presented to the Court—current Justices
203. Id. Justice Thomas reprised much of this argument in his dissent in June Medical
Services. 140 S. Ct. at 2151 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
204. Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
205. Id.
206. Nelson, supra note 8, at 3.
207. Id. at 53.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See supra Part III.A.
211. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 53.
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should not use their disagreement with that view as grounds to
overturn it. That disagreement merely triggers consideration of the
costs of overturning the decision, in accord with the special justifica-
tions in the strong stare decisis tradition.
I depart with Nelson (and more sharply with Justices Thomas
and Kavanaugh) in the suggestion that there is a wide category of
demonstrably erroneous precedents undeserving of stare decisis
protection.212 Experience counsels otherwise. The Justices are locked
in disagreement about whether many decisions are merely unwise,
yet permissible and understandable as a matter of substantive law.
Those Justices cannot possibly agree as to what makes a decision so
demonstrably erroneous that it is not permissible and cannot stand
as a matter of principle. To prove that a constitutional decision is
demonstrably erroneous requires the Justices to apply their own
interpretive methodologies to the question, which will produce
varied, if not wholly dichotomous, results. Nelson’s (and Thomas’s
and Kavanaugh’s) theory is thus “derivative of broader theories of
constitutional interpretation,” and therefore doomed to “collapse
into debates about which interpretive approach is best.”213 For stare
decisis to constrain Justices across the ideological spectrum, it must
not rely upon any particular interpretive method; yet determina-
tions of the degree of error in a prior decision will always rely upon
particular interpretive methods. Using a precedent’s degree of error
to determine when it should be overturned is thus circular and self-
defeating.
Nelson admits that some may disagree that demonstrably erro-
neous precedents are readily identifiable; if fewer such precedents
exist, efforts to eliminate them will likely generate “false positives,”
unnecessarily overruling a great many decisions and creating more
practical problems than the very few erroneous precedents did in
the first place.214 He counters that, if the sources of legal decisions
are so radically indeterminate that no “correct” answers can be
212. See id. at 55-60; Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1985 (2019) (Thomas, J.,
concurring); Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1414-15 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring).
213. KOZEL, supra note 16, at 61.
214. Nelson, supra note 8, at 80 (“[O]ne might well think that trying to identify ‘demon-
strable errors’ will be like looking for needles in a haystack. The fewer ‘demonstrable errors’
actually exist, the more one might think that the benefits of trying to eliminate those errors
are outweighed by the risks that courts will reach ‘false positives.’ This line of analysis might
well lead one toward the stronger version of stare decisis.”).
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identified and thus almost any interpretation is permissible, then
precedent decisions will also be radically indeterminate to the point
that subsequent Justices can reach any decision they like while
claiming they are upholding the precedent.215
But I need not adopt radical indeterminism to argue that a weak
version of stare decisis, which would overrule demonstrably
erroneous precedents for that reason alone, will generate far too
many false positives to justify the practice. My contention is founded
in the lived experience of Supreme Court decision-making, not
linguistic indeterminism. The Justices’ interpretive methods are
often diametrically opposed to one another. They struggle simply to
agree which precedents are “wrong,” yet might be considered
permissible under Nelson’s theory. Efforts to identify precedents
that are so demonstrably erroneous as to merit overruling on that
ground alone will similarly end in widespread disagreement. Such
disagreement is not the fault of the language, but rather of the
inability, if not impossibility, of Justices agreeing on how to
interpret the law in the first place.
Theories like Nelson’s, Thomas’s, and Kavanaugh’s imply that
Justices in the majority should overrule decisions when their own
interpretive methodology suggests extreme error in prior decisions.
That view is shortsighted. What is a majority view on interpretive
methodology today may be a minority view tomorrow. If the Court’s
theory of precedent deems “demonstrable error” correction appropri-
ate, Justices of all interpretive stripes are likely to seek massive
changes in jurisprudential course each time they find themselves in
the present majority. That will lead the Court to play jurispruden-
tial ping-pong in its decisions over the course of history, veering
between substantive legal extremes and undermining society’s
reliance upon, and belief in the legitimacy of, the Supreme Court.
William Baude has noted an analogous problem in determining
which constitutional provisions are sufficiently indeterminate to
be subject to constitutional “liquidation”—a method to settle con-
stitutional meaning in the political branches through a course of
215. See id. at 79 (“[I]f words are indeterminate when they appear in written laws, they
presumably are also indeterminate when they appear as statements of a court’s holding.
Thus, just as statutes and constitutional provisions cannot really constrain judges, neither
can past opinions. For people who believe in the radical indeterminacy of legal language, it
is hard to have any meaningful theory of stare decisis at all.” (footnote omitted)).
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deliberate, accepted practice.216 According to Baude, our society may
“have so much disagreement over theories of interpretation more
generally that we cannot even agree on the proper methods for
finding ambiguity.”217 If “indeterminacy itself is indeterminate,”
there is a great risk that “each interpreter will find indeterminacy
whenever liquidation is convenient for her, and avoid it when
liquidation is inconvenient.”218 If that is so, liquidation will not
constrain constitutional decision-making, but instead offer it new
freedoms.219 Similarly, the lack of agreement over methods of con-
stitutional interpretation makes agreement that a decision is so
poorly reasoned that it requires reversal difficult, if not impossible.
Such indeterminacy creates the opportunity for each Justice to find
poor reasoning whenever it is convenient, and thus to justify
overruling precedent with little constraint from the stare decisis
doctrine.
Furthermore, Nelson’s position misunderstands the role of the
practical considerations that can counsel against preserving a
precedent in the strong stare decisis tradition. Nelson suggests that
practical considerations, like workability and reliance, might show
the Justices when there is a good reason to overrule a permissible,
but erroneous, interpretation.220 But those stare decisis factors are
not a sword to aid overruling; they are a shield to protect against
overzealous reversals that might have disastrous real-world conse-
quences. What those factors measure, in part, is whether a decision
with which the Justices disagree is so erroneous that it can be
overruled, because it will not upset societal expectations or will
replace a rule that even its supporters struggled to implement.221 By
measuring the disruption that might be caused by overturning a
precedent, both in the public perception and in the coherence of the
Court’s and the nation’s jurisprudence, these factors will often
protect an otherwise teetering precedent from being overruled.
216. Baude, supra note 196, at 67-68.
217. Id. at 67.
218. Id. at 68.
219. Id.
220. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 53.
221. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992)
(plurality opinion).
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The factors in the strong stare decisis tradition are more appro-
priate for the role Nelson imagines they might play in evaluating an
impermissible, demonstrably erroneous precedent.222 In those rare
cases, Nelson suggests that practical considerations can provide a
reason to adhere to precedent.223 Though this correctly explains the
role of practical considerations, it unduly minimizes the effect of
those practical considerations, making them nearly meaningless.
According to Nelson, when a precedent must rely upon practical
considerations for preservation, it is making a desperate Hail Mary
pass; the Justices will already have determined that the precedent
is demonstrably erroneous, and thus seemingly only worthy of pres-
ervation if the practical consequences of overturning are similarly
demonstrably catastrophic.224 Essentially, the demonstrably erro-
neous evaluation swallows the rest of the stare decisis analysis
whole, leaving it with only one true factor for the Justices to
consider: whether or not they disagree with the precedent. That
formulation, much like the Janus Court’s emphasis on the poor
reasoning in a precedent that justifies overruling it,225 undermines
stare decisis beyond repair with grave consequences for our nation’s
legal stability.
C. The Consequences of the Weak Stare Decisis Tradition
If poor reasoning is both a condition precedent to, and a substan-
tive component of, stare decisis, then stare decisis itself may become
so internally incoherent as to be unworkable. Even supporters of the
weak stare decisis tradition cannot logically implement a doctrine
whose primary analytical tool requires a nonexistent, widespread
consensus about the substantive correctness of prior decisions. As
Chief Justice Roberts has acknowledged, “It is not enough that you
may think the prior decision was wrongly decided. That really
doesn’t answer the question. It just poses the question.”226
222. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 53.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2478-
79 (2018).
226. Roberts Hearing, supra note 16. In June Medical Services L.L.C. v. Russo, Roberts
similarly suggested that “for precedent to mean anything, the doctrine must give way only to
a rationale that goes beyond whether the case was decided correctly.” 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134
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Stare decisis is a mechanism to constrain Justices from overturn-
ing every case with which they disagree. For the doctrine to have
teeth, in at least some cases, “it must tell decision makers to make
decisions they think mistaken on first-order substantive grounds.”227
If stare decisis never tells a Justice to preserve a case with which
they substantively disagree, it does no jurisprudential work. Stare
decisis must be able to instruct the Justices that some prior
decisions, simply because they were decided previously, should be
preserved independent of the current Justices’ belief about the
quality of the reasoning in those decisions.228
Janus has solidified a faulty path to overturning a prior decision.
It is now a precedent on precedent of increasing prominence that
suggests the poor reasoning of a prior decision is not merely a
condition precedent for the consideration of stare decisis doctrine,
but rather a substantive factor in stare decisis analysis that will al-
most certainly tilt the scales against precedent in each subsequent
case.229 Though Janus did not list any entirely new justifications for
overruling precedent, “the very act of listing and purporting to use”
the poor reasoning factor “lays the groundwork in future cases for
a further weakening of whatever strength a norm of stare decisis
may hold.”230 As noted above, the jurisprudential seeds of Janus
have already begun to bear fruit, allowing the Court to find more
reasons that precedents should fall.231 Left unchecked, Janus-faced
judging will continue to undermine stability in the Supreme Court’s
(2020) (Roberts, C.J., concurring). Justice Scalia also similarly remarked that when Justices
overrule a case despite stare decisis, they “must give reasons, and reasons that go beyond
mere demonstration that the overruled opinion was wrong (otherwise the doctrine would be
no doctrine at all).” Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 716 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
227. Schauer, supra note 7, at 128.
228. See id. at 125. Put another way, “stare decisis grants authority to the past simply
because of its pastness.” Id. Schauer, however, argues that as an empirical reality, stare
decisis has not had that effect on the Court. Instead, several empirical studies have shown
that stare decisis’s primary effect is on the rhetoric of a decision to overrule a prior decision,
rather than as a constraining mechanism that genuinely affects the outcome of cases. Id. at
129-30 (summarizing the empirical research on the issue).
229. See supra Part II.B.
230. Schauer, supra note 7, at 137-38.
231. See supra Part II.C (explaining that the Court cited Janus’s version of stare decisis
to repeatedly argue that precedents should be struck down in the 2018 and 2019 Terms).
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jurisprudence and render the stare decisis doctrine itself an
unworkable, and perhaps reversible, rule of law.
The Supreme Court’s current stare decisis formulation may also
reduce the deference that lower federal courts show for Court
precedent. Today, lower court adherence to Supreme Court prece-
dent is so consistent that rare examples of direct defiance are highly
notable.232 But if the Court is willing to overrule prior cases simply
because the Justices believe the decisions are poorly reasoned and
hence substantively incorrect, little would constrain lower courts
from taking the same tack in cases when the lower courts are
confident that a majority of the Court agrees that a prior decision
was poorly reasoned. Such a form of “anticipatory overruling” could
become commonplace as lower courts disregard Supreme Court
precedent they predict the Court itself will shortly overrule.233
Lower courts may even read cases expressing the Court’s disen-
chantment with a precedent, such as Alito’s rebukes of Abood in the
run-up to Janus,234 as a signal that such decisions are already all
but eradicated and can be ignored.235 The costs of such a practice, if
it became widespread, are clear. Legal stability would be signif-
icantly undermined if lower courts could act independently to
change Supreme Court doctrine; legal disuniformity could prolif-
erate as various lower courts accept different constructions of
Supreme Court precedent over time;236 and the perceived legitimacy
232. See, e.g., Baude, supra note 196, at 40 (explaining that lower court adherence to
Supreme Court precedent is so uniform that “apparent exceptions—such as Judge Silberman
announcing that he would effectively nullify Boumediene v. Bush unless the Supreme Court
made him stop, or lower courts seeming to resist the Supreme Court’s decision in Heller—are
sufficiently rare and controversial” (footnotes omitted)).
233. See, e.g., Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO.
L.J. 921, 941 (2016) (discussing the practice of “anticipatory overruling” and its potential
shortcomings).
234. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
235. See Richard L. Hasen, Anticipatory Overrulings, Invitations, Time Bombs, and
Inadvertence: How Supreme Court Justices Move the Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 779, 781 (2012)
(“‘Anticipatory overruling’ occurs when the Court does not overrule precedent but suggests
its intention to do so in a future case.”); Re, supra note 233, at 942 (discussing Supreme Court
“signals” that Justices use to “indicate some aspect of how lower courts should decide cases”).
236. See Re, supra note 233, at 924. More broadly, this practice would solidify a lower court
decision-making model based upon predictions of what the lower court judges believe a
majority of the Supreme Court is likely to do. See id. at 940-42 (discussing the “prediction
model” of legal correctness). Re has argued that the Supreme Court has already suggested its
agreement with this model of lower court decision-making in cases that have taken a
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of the Supreme Court’s decisions would be significantly under-
mined.237
Additionally, if Janus becomes entrenched as the Court’s leading
precedent on precedent, the Court will likely become even more
overtly politicized than it is today. Janus’s version of the weak stare
decisis tradition leaves Justices with almost no obligation to follow
the direction of their prior brethren on the bench. If the membership
of the Court is the only constraint upon doctrinal change, alter-
ations to that membership become even more important to future
decisions. Confirmation hearings will become the last opportunity
to influence the new direction that the Court may take because the
utility of precedent-based legal arguments in individual cases will
decline precipitously. Because each subsequent Justice will have the
opportunity to reverse the course of doctrine wholesale, all parties
will rightly perceive that any Justice with ideological inclinations
contrary to the current state of doctrine can readily implement those
preferences without any constraint. The appointments process will
be stuck in a one-way ratchet to further politicization and rancor.
Nominees may overtly campaign for appointment by making private
or public suggestions about which cases they will vote to overturn
once confirmed. Without the constraint of stare decisis, the slippery
slope to such judicial politicking by Supreme Court Justices is left
open.
* * * 
As the weak stare decisis tradition’s new acme, Janus presents a
self-defeating version of the doctrine. It posits that the poor quality
of a decision’s reasoning is both a condition precedent to consider-
ation of the stare decisis doctrine and a sufficient condition to
“permissive attitude” towards “provocative narrowing” of Supreme Court precedent from
lower courts. Id. at 958.
237. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 68. Caleb Nelson acknowledged the potential risks to
judicial legitimacy that a weaker version of stare decisis may present, noting that “[a]ccording
to many commentators, frequent overruling jeopardizes public acceptance of the courts’
decisions.” Id. But Nelson plausibly retorts that a Court that habitually follows demonstrably
erroneous precedents will likewise hold little legitimacy in the public eye. Id. at 69. As noted
above, because I disagree with Nelson’s claim that there is a large category of readily-
identifiable demonstrably erroneous precedents, see supra notes 212-14 and accompanying
text, I likewise disagree that the Court loses legitimacy by upholding such precedents.
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overrule the decision. Assigning those dual functions to the quality
of reasoning factor makes the doctrine unworkable; even Janus’s
supporters cannot logically discern a nonexistent consensus about
the substantive correctness of prior decisions. Janus’s formulation
also has vast potential to undermine legal stability. It allows
Justices themselves to rapidly change course, rendering the Court
ever more politicized in the eyes of the public. It invites lower courts
to deviate from Supreme Court precedent that appears substan-
tively incorrect. Janus’s emerging role as an authoritative precedent
on precedent thus presents a grave danger to the Court.
IV. PRECEDENTIAL VINTAGE
As noted previously, several recent recitations of the weak stare
decisis tradition suggested that a precedent’s “antiquity” helps
determine its precedential value.238 This Part will first illustrate the
Court’s historical approach to older precedents, noting how Janus
changes that approach. Next, this Part will discuss why prece-
dential age may be an attractive stare decisis factor, given that it
acts as a proxy for other desirable values. Next, this Part will note
the dangers in what I call a “wave theory” of stare decisis, which
seems particularly likely to take hold on the Court post-Janus.
Finally, this Part reconsiders the proper role for precedential age in
the stare decisis analysis, concluding that deference for older
precedents, combined with genuinely critical review of newer
precedents, is normatively desirable.
A. The Court’s Historical Approach to Historical Decisions
In Pearson, the Court suggested that a “rule that was recently
adopted” is entitled to less deference from the Court simply because
of its relative infancy;239 Montejo reiterated that idea when over-
ruling a decision that was just over two decades old.240 But Janus
did not expressly apply that “antiquity” language. Instead the Janus
Court emphasized that some older precedents are entitled to less
238. See supra notes 75, 79 and accompanying text.
239. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009).
240. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 793 (2009).
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deference, casting a precedent’s age in a new light.241 Following
Janus, the weak stare decisis tradition has grounds to attack a
precedent’s age no matter how long it has been on the books. All
precedents, whether aged a few years or a few decades, are entitled
to less deference under either the Pearson/Montejo “antiquity” view
or the Janus discussion of older decisions that are substantively
flawed.
Historically, the Court’s precedents on precedent have given an
unclear role to the age of a precedent. As an objectively measurable
criterion, age holds great potential to cut across the ideological
differences and interpretive methodologies of different Justices,
thereby helping Justices agree when a decision is ripe for overrul-
ing.242 But the Court has not offered a consistent, convincing account
of when a precedent’s age entitles it to greater deference or ex-
plained why overruling older precedents may be more problematic
than overruling younger ones.243 Pearson and Montejo both sug-
gested that a more recent rule is entitled to less deference from the
Court because of its infancy.244 But the Court has strayed from that
suggestion significantly in recent years. In 2020’s June Medical
Services L.L.C. v. Russo, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the
decision in Whole Woman’s Health reached just four years earlier
garnered significant deference, forcing Roberts to follow a rule he
felt was incorrect.245 Nowhere did Roberts discuss the claim that
recent decisions receive less deference. The Court also undermined
the Pearson/Montejo suggestion in Janus. The Janus Court claimed
that older decisions that are substantively incorrect receive less
deference, both because they may have worked a substantive in-
justice for longer and because they have been subject to repeated
criticism over their life span.246 Janus used that rationale to
241. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2484-86 (2018).
242. Randy Kozel rightly notes that possibility, highlighting that “[v]intage is the type of
objective, independent factor that lends itself to application by [J]ustices across the
methodological spectrum.” KOZEL, supra note 16, at 125.
243. Id.
244. Pearson, 555 U.S. at 233; Montejo, 556 U.S. at 793.
245. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133-34 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
246. Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2484-86.
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buttress overruling the forty-one-year-old decision in Abood, casting
doubt on the role of age in the weak stare decisis tradition.
The Court’s failure to explain the role of age may stem from the
Justices’ unwillingness to draw bright lines in stare decisis doctrine.
Nothing in the Constitution requires a specific expiration date for
previous interpretations of the document.247 Even when Justices use
stare decisis to uphold a controversial precedent, they are quick to
note that the doctrine is fluid and “not an inexorable command.”248
Putting Janus aside, Justices across the ideological and interpre-
tive spectrums recently appeared to coalesce around the idea that
especially old precedents are worthy of more deference. One
example is 2019’s Gamble v. United States, in which the Court
reaffirmed the separate sovereigns rule—the idea that a state does
not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause by prosecuting a defendant
under state law even if the federal government has already
prosecuted the same defendant for the same conduct.249 Justice Alito
wrote the majority opinion in Gamble, joined by six Justices across
the ideological spectrum.250 Citing Montejo, Alito claimed that “the
strength of the case for adhering to [prior] decisions grows in
proportion to their ‘antiquity.’”251 Alito thus posited that the
defendant challenging the separate sovereigns rule “must overcome
numerous major decisions of this Court spanning 170 years,” and
therefore his “historical evidence must, at a minimum, be better
than middling.”252 The Court then upheld the centuries-old separate
sovereigns rule.253
Similar themes emerged in the Court’s 2010 decision in McDon-
ald v. City of Chicago.254 In McDonald, the Court declined to invoke
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
as the basis for making the Second Amendment binding on the
247. See Starger, supra note 8, at 22.
248. See, e.g., Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000); Planned Parenthood
of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (plurality opinion).
249. 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1963-64 (2019).
250. Justice Alito’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Breyer,
Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan, and Kavanaugh. Id. at 1963. Justice Thomas also authored a
concurring opinion. Id. at 1980 (Thomas, J., concurring).
251. Id. at 1969 (majority opinion) (quoting Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 792 (2009)).
252. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
253. Id. at 1964.
254. 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
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states.255 In doing so, the Court noted that the tradition of relying
upon the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause to protect
constitutional rights against state infringement dates back to the
Slaughter-House Cases of 1873.256 According to Justice Alito’s
majority opinion in McDonald, there was “no need to reconsider that
interpretation” given that, “[f]or many decades, the question of the
rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state
infringement has been analyzed under the Due Process Clause of
that Amendment and not under the Privileges or Immunities
Clause.”257 Thus, without expressly invoking the “antiquity” factor
in Montejo, the Court in McDonald showed its reticence to reverse
a nearly 140-year-old rule without a significant reason to do so.
This trend to honor well-aged precedents was undercut slightly
in June Medical Services, when Chief Justice Roberts suggested he
was bound by the four-year-old decision in Whole Woman’s Health.258
But Roberts never directly addressed how age affected a precedent,
be it ancient or immature. Thus, the long-term repercussions of
June Medical Services on the Court’s approach to precedential
vintage, if any, are difficult to predict.
B. Age as a Proxy
Are especially old precedents entitled to special weight? Though
age is an objectively measurable criterion, age itself carries no
normative value. Instead, age’s potential as a stare decisis value
comes from its ability to act as a proxy for principles already
accepted as a component of the doctrine.
For instance, age may carry value as a proxy for reliance in-
terests. Justice Scalia argued in 1989’s South Carolina v. Gathers
“that the respect accorded prior decisions increases ... with their
antiquity, as the society adjusts itself to their existence, and the
surrounding law becomes premised upon their validity.”259 Scalia
255. Id. at 758.
256. See id. at 754-58.
257. Id. at 758.
258. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133-34 (2020) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring).
259. 490 U.S. 805, 824 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting), overruled by Payne v. Tennessee, 501
U.S. 808 (1991).
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likewise contended that especially young precedents should receive
less deference because reliance interests have not yet solidified
around them: “The freshness of error not only deprives [a precedent]
of the respect to which long-established practice is entitled, but also
counsels that the opportunity of correction be seized at once, before
state and federal laws and practices have been adjusted to embody
it.”260 Randy Kozel has similarly theorized that older precedents
receive more deference because they have proven sound and have
“had more time to generate reliance by stakeholders,” while newer
precedents can be corrected before such reliance interests solidify.261
Similarly, the age of a precedent may be tied to perceptions of the
Court’s legitimacy. When the Court sustains a rule for many
decades, it gives societal stakeholders an opportunity to order their
affairs accordingly. This is especially true when the rule touches
upon business or commercial interests, areas in which doctrinal
stability is especially important to the national economy. A Court
that encourages citizens to trust that older decisions will remain
undisturbed increases its legitimacy, both in the eyes of those
citizens who come to trust the Court’s word and in the broader
economic landscape in which the Court can play a steadying role.
Age may also serve as a proxy measurement of the reaffirmation
of a precedent over time. Such reaffirmation lends extra weight to
a precedent.262 The longer a decision has lasted, the more likely it
has met with approval from legal thinkers across the ideological
spectrum. Contrary cases will be readily identifiable; members of
the Court may signal their disagreement with the reasoning of a
260. Id.
261. KOZEL, supra note 16, at 124.
262. STRAUSS, supra note 196, at 96. As David Strauss has argued, “When a precedent has
been repeatedly reexamined and reaffirmed, over many years by a Court whose composition
has changed, that should give us greater confidence that the precedent is correct.” Id. In
contrast,
An old precedent that has never been reexamined, but has simply slipped into
the background, has less of a claim on our allegiance than one that has been
critically reexamined and reaffirmed; the later precedent is more likely to reflect
the kind of accumulated practical wisdom that the common law approach values.
Id. Similarly for Kozel, “[I]f a decision has been reaffirmed by numerous judges across
multiple cases, we might be more inclined to think deference is appropriate.” KOZEL, supra
note 16, at 40. Kozel adds that “[t]here is good reason to draw distinctions such as these if
deference to precedent is grounded in beliefs about individual limitations and the collective
wisdom of the ages.” Id.
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precedent—much as Justice Alito’s jurisprudence that led up to
Janus’s decision to overrule Abood263—offering the precedent’s
supporters one final opportunity to defend it in court before
reversing course.264 Absent such repeated, clear criticisms of a
precedent’s validity, age again may signal that a precedent has been
accepted and reaffirmed as correct over time.
Critics might contend that the older a precedent, the more likely
that the precedent’s factual underpinnings have changed so much
as to rob it of modern relevance—a special justification for overrul-
ing within the strong stare decisis tradition.265 Though valid, this
critique does not itself defeat the potential value of age as an
objective factor in the stare decisis doctrine. It is surely true that
the longer a precedent has existed, the more opportunity facts have
had to shift underneath that precedent’s feet. But that shift should
stand as its own factor to consider within the stare decisis calculus,
as the strong stare decisis tradition suggests.266 Perhaps in cases
where a precedent’s age is invoked as a ground for special deference,
Justices should closely examine the possibility that the precedent’s
factual underpinnings have shifted, thereby counterbalancing the
potential for weighing a precedent’s age too heavily in the analysis.
With that counterbalance in place, though, it seems that age might
persevere as a useful stare decisis factor.
If precedential age holds value as a proxy for reliance interests
and Supreme Court legitimacy, then Janus’s claim that older
precedents should be overruled because they have been violating
rights longer or faced lengthier critiques is especially dubious. The
Janus view misunderstands the reliance interest calculus that may
favor a precedent, all in an apparent effort to make changes of
course more readily justifiable. Age and reliance are undeniably
related: the longer a precedent has existed, the more likely it is that
interested stakeholders will have ordered their affairs around that
precedent, on the expectation that no drastic changes in the legal
263. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
264. See Re, supra note 93, at 644-45 (“When the Court gives notice that a precedent is on
unstable ground, reliance interests are plausibly reduced, even if not eliminated. But when
a precedent is affirmed or referred to another branch, the resulting notice preserves or
reinforces the interests of reliant parties.”).
265. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992) (plurality
opinion).
266. See, e.g., id.
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landscape would emerge. Janus complicates the task for such
stakeholders. It requires them to identify when a precedent’s
reasoning is so poor that it is likely to be overturned—a task, as
noted above, that the Justices themselves seem unlikely to ful-
fill267—and then reorder their affairs based upon the expectation
that the Court will soon change course. This both dilutes age’s value
as an objective factor in the stare decisis calculus and needlessly
complicates the process through which ordinary citizens come to
rely upon the Court’s decisions.
Of course, under strong stare decisis, Justices can still overturn
older precedents, though perhaps less frequently. Justices may be
able to limit the damage to reliance interests by signaling the
wobbliness of an ancient precedent in a series of tentative decisions
that both give notice to interested parties to change their personal
arrangements and offer the opportunity to the precedent’s defenders
to rescue it in future cases.268 This route to overruling may be even
more normatively desirable if it, too, is a slow-moving mechanism
played out over more than one judicial generation. A present Jus-
tice might express disagreement with an ancient precedent’s factual
underpinnings but refuse to personally overrule it until a new
generation of Justices has reviewed the same precedent and reached
the same conclusion. That new generation would feel less con-
strained in changing course if they agree that the precedent is
outdated. At that point, several jurists would have agreed that the
ancient precedent needs adjustment, suggesting that the precedent’s
errors were truly so grave that a change in course was appropriate.
That would likewise lend the overruling decision itself some
historical clout to rival the historical bona fides of the ancient
precedent.
267. See supra notes 193-94 and accompanying text.
268. This argument is adopted from Richard M. Re’s “doctrine of one last chance,” whereby
the Court signals willingness to overturn a decision without actually doing so, giving the
decision’s defenders one final chance to defend it in the next case that arrives and the Court
the freedom to overturn with less disruption to settled reliance interests. See Re, supra note
93, at 636.
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C. Dangers in a “Wave Theory” of Stare Decisis
Unfortunately, Justices often adopt what I call a “wave theory” of
stare decisis, making contrary suggestions about its binding
strength over time. Suppose that Judicial Generation A establishes
a status quo on a particular jurisprudential question. When a new
generation of Justices takes the bench—call it Generation B—that
generation frequently adopts a weak stare decisis tradition that
allows freedom to immediately change existing jurisprudence with
which Generation B may substantively disagree. Generation B will
thus effect great change to align the law with their substantive
preferences, all while claiming fidelity to a relatively weak stare
decisis tradition. But the members of Generation B will likely adopt
a strong stare decisis view later in their careers. Once Generation
B begins to feel that the gains it has made are under threat from yet
another generation of Justices—call them Generation C—then
Generation B will favor a stronger stare decisis tradition in order to
protect the apparent gains it has made from being overruled. Justice
Douglas sagely described this phenomenon in 1949, noting that
“[t]oday’s new and startling decision quickly becomes a coveted
anchorage for new vested interests. The former proponents of
change acquire an acute conservatism in their new status quo.”269
The Warren Court, of which Douglas was a part,270 well illus-
trated this principle. As one example, consider its take on the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.271 Prior to the
Warren Court, Fifth Amendment jurisprudence firmly established
that government investigators did not need to warn a criminal
suspect of the right to remain silent prior to securing a confession
that would be admissible at trial.272 The prosecution could move to
269. William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 737 (1949) (“It will then
take an oncoming group from a new generation to catch the broader vision which may require
an undoing of the work of our present and their past.”).
270. See Justices 1789 to Present, SUP. CT. U.S., https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/
members_text.aspx [https://perma.cc/H2P6-N4RR].
271. “No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”
U.S. CONST. amend. V. Other examples might include the Warren Court’s approach to the
exclusionary rule or equal protection as applied to voting rights. See Powe, Jr., supra note 190,
at 2104-06 (summarizing the Warren Court’s “explosive change[s]” in these areas).
272. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 502 (1966) (Clark, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (“The rule prior to today ... depended upon ‘a totality of circumstances
evidencing an involuntary ... admission of guilt.’” (second omission in original) (quoting
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admit such a confession upon a showing, supported by the totality
of the circumstances, that the confession was voluntary and not the
result of coercive force.273
Perhaps quite justifiably, the Warren Court found this test deeply
problematic given the potential for abusive tactics that eluded
judicial oversight and the fact-intensive inquiry it required in lower
courts.274 The Warren Court thus hinted at possible changes in
1964’s Escobedo v. Illinois, when it seemed to suggest that counsel
may be required to protect against police abuse.275 Then, in 1966’s
Miranda v. Arizona, the Warren Court established what are now
remarkably well-known protections for suspects in a custodial
interrogation—including the requirement that investigators inform
the defendant both of his right to remain silent and of the conse-
quences of speaking—before a confession could be admitted in
court.276 Miranda marked a sea change in Fifth Amendment
doctrine and a cultural flash point in the decades that followed.277
But when making this momentous change, the Court took a remark-
ably lax attitude towards stare decisis. Nowhere in the Miranda
decision did the Warren Court explicitly address the doctrine, let
alone discuss the cases that established the prior rule admitting
confessions made voluntarily.
Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963))); Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623
(1896) (“[I]t is laid down that it is not essential to the admissibility of a confession that it
should appear that the person was warned that what he said would be used against him, but
on the contrary, if the confession was voluntary, it is sufficient though it appear that he was
not so warned.”).
273. See, e.g., Haynes, 373 U.S. at 513; Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 602 (1944).
274. For a helpful discussion of the Warren Court’s discomfort with the pre-Miranda
totality of the circumstances test, see Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with
Particular Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 17-18 (2010).
275. 378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (“We hold, therefore, that where, as here, the investigation
is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of
interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has
requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not
effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has
been denied ‘the Assistance of Counsel’ in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution as ‘made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,’ and that
no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a
criminal trial.” (quoting Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963))).
276. 384 U.S. at 467-69, 479.
277. See FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND 318-19 (1970); see also Friedman,
supra note 274, at 18.
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Miranda quickly faced resistance, both from Congress and newly
appointed Justices.278 In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act, which included a provision that
purported to overrule Miranda for federal investigations.279 After
President Nixon appointed a series of new Justices to the Court,
new majorities began to systematically reduce the impact of
Miranda’s protections, if not outright overrule the decision—first by
creating exceptions to its application, and later by suggesting that
it was a mere prophylactic rule rather than a constitutional
mandate.280
Members of the Warren Court aligned in resistance to the
changes in Miranda sought by this later generation of Justices.
Justice Brennan noted that the Court’s decision permitting
prosecutors to impeach defendants with confessions obtained in
violation of Miranda “goes far toward undoing much of the progress
made in conforming police methods to the Constitution.”281 Justice
Marshall protested that a public-safety exception to Miranda’s
protections “abandon[ed] the clear guidelines” of Miranda, standing
“in direct conflict with [the] Court’s longstanding interpretation of
the Fifth Amendment.”282 Brennan and Marshall later joined in
dissent to accuse the new generation of Justices of “a studied
campaign to strip the Miranda decision piecemeal and to undermine
the rights Miranda sought to secure.”283 Though these dissents did
not directly engage the language of stare decisis, they exemplified
the Warren Court’s alarm at new Justices’ efforts to erode Miranda
without due deference to it. Yet those sounding the alarm never
mentioned how significant a change Miranda itself was to existing
doctrine at the time it was decided.
278. See Friedman, supra note 274, at 18 (“Miranda was instantly controversial and in fact
led to the undoing of the Warren Court.”).
279. See Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, tit. II, § 701(a), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501, invalidated by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000); GRAHAM, supra note
277, at 319-20. Though federal prosecutors declined to rely upon the statute for decades, it
became the subject of the controversial decision reaffirming Miranda. See Dickerson, 530 U.S.
at 432 (holding that Congress could not legislatively overrule Miranda).
280. See Friedman, supra note 274, at 18-21 (discussing Dickerson, 530 U.S. 428; Oregon
v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971)).
281. Harris, 401 U.S. at 232 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
282. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 674, 678 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
283. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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These alarms against undoing Warren Court changes (that were
themselves a drastic change from the prior status quo) were part of
a broader conception of stare decisis ascribed to by the Warren
Court’s members in the later years of their careers. For example, in
the early 1970s, Justice Goldberg sought to defend Warren Court
decisions from being overruled by proclaiming that new Justices
should adhere to a relatively strong stare decisis tradition.284 For
Goldberg, the Warren Court did not violate stare decisis when it
vastly expanded civil liberties, because “stare decisis applies with
an uneven force” that permits such expansions.285 Stare decisis was
a one-way ratchet: “[W]hen the Supreme Court seeks to overrule in
order to cut back the individual’s fundamental, constitutional
protections against governmental interference, the commands of
stare decisis are all but absolute; yet when a court overrules to
expand personal liberties, the doctrine interposes a markedly less
restrictive caution.”286 Post-Warren Court Justices should thus have
deferred to the prior generation’s expansive protections against
government interference with personal liberty.287
I do not take any position here on the substantive accuracy of
Miranda or its status as a necessary constitutional rule.288 I simply
use it to highlight one example, of which there are many,289 of
Justices applying a “wave theory” of stare decisis during their
careers. When they are a part of a new generational shift, Justices
will often support a weaker stare decisis tradition.290 Yet, later in
their careers, as a new generation threatens the changes they have
284. See ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, EQUAL JUSTICE: THE WARREN ERA OF THE SUPREME COURT
72-75 (1971).
285. Id. at 74-75.
286. Id.
287. See id.
288. Indeed, the Miranda decision itself may have been justified on stare decisis grounds
if the Warren Court had engaged in that discussion within the decision.
289. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 277, at 321 (“The complaint most frequently heard about
the Warren Court during the 1960s was that the Justices had taken it upon themselves to
change the law according to their own notions—that they were legislating, making the law
instead of interpreting it, usurping the powers of Congress and the states. Wise old heads
knew that this complaint had been hurled at the Supreme Court (and other courts as well)
since the days of John Marshall and before.”); Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in Historical
Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L. REV. 647, 657-59
(1999) (noting criticisms of the Rehnquist Court’s arguably inconsistent approach to stare
decisis).
290. See, e.g., Douglas, supra note 269, at 737.
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made, those same Justices will shift to a stronger form of stare
decisis, hoping to solidify their perceived doctrinal gains.291
Such waves in stare decisis are normatively undesirable for
several reasons. To begin, they are intellectually inconsistent, if not
dishonest. The Justice who ascribes to changing conceptions of stare
decisis over time, in fact, ascribes to no real, binding version of stare
decisis at all. Although I have argued in favor of a strong stare
decisis tradition rather than a weak one,292 perhaps even more
damaging is a “wave theory” of stare decisis that allows Justices to
shift the strength of the doctrine at their whim. That does not
merely allow Justices to change the law whenever they choose; it
allows them to change the law, then protect whatever drastic
changes they have made against further adjustment by later
generations. And it does so without sufficient normative justification
for a practice that favors only the immediate generation’s decisions.
Aside from the inherent intellectual inconsistency of a wave
theory of stare decisis, these theories would render stare decisis so
malleable as to become meaningless. In the name of protecting their
own decisions, Justices that vacillate between weak and strong
stare decisis traditions instead set the table for future generations
of Justices to change their views on stare decisis as they please. In
the long run, such vacillation weakens all of the Court’s decisions
equally. The consequences for legal stability and the Court’s legit-
imacy could be dire.
D. Youth Revisited
What deference, then, is owed to relatively young precedents in
the stare decisis analysis? As an empirical matter, the Justices
historically have not given much deference to younger decisions.
When the Supreme Court has overturned one of its own opinions, it
has largely focused on those that are less than twenty years old.293
Overturned opinions in that category make up more than 50 percent
of all overturned opinions; in contrast, opinions more than 40 years
291. See, e.g., id.
292. See supra Part III.
293. See Willingham, supra note 1.
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old make up less than a quarter of all overturned opinions.294 The
Court’s 2020 decision in June Medical Services following the four-
year-old decision in Whole Woman’s Health stands as a notable
outlier to this trend.295 The Court’s discussions of antiquity in
Pearson and Montejo—which overturned precedents aged just eight
and twenty-three years, respectively296—were more accurate repre-
sentations of the Court’s historical approach to young precedents.297
The normative desirability of that approach merits closer
analysis. There is risk in reversing course quickly when the only
change in the interim is one of Court personnel.298 Such rapid
changes are likely to diminish the Court’s legitimacy in the public
eye, even if it might have a limited practical effect on the reliance
that interested parties have placed upon prior decisions. These
changes might also tempt lower courts to effectively ignore recent
precedents until they are reaffirmed, providing some showing that
the Supreme Court really meant what it only recently said.
But perhaps a short window for reversal in the early life of a
precedent would help the Court achieve more accurate results.
Recall that precedential age holds value, in part, because it is a
proxy for judicial review and approval over time.299 Such review, in
turn, only carries normative value if it is a genuine crucible for the
precedent to overcome in the eyes of skeptical Justices. Only if those
early reviewing Justices were genuinely free to change course would
their review truly carry that normative value. Justices reviewing a
young precedent for the first time should feel less obligated to defer
to that decision than they might feel when reconsidering a much
older precedent that has already been reviewed and approved
hundreds of times over; that early review can only support the likely
294. See id. Writing in 2008, Michael Gerhardt concluded that “[t]he average life span of
an overruled precedent is 29.2 years.” MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 11
(2008).
295. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103 (2020).
296. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 233 (2009); Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778,
792-93 (2009).
297. For additional examples of cases that were overruled relatively quickly, see Powe, Jr.,
supra note 190, at 2110-11 & nn.162-72.
298. As discussed earlier, Justice Marshall was harshly critical of overruling recent
precedents when “[n]either the law nor the facts” but “[o]nly the personnel of this Court” had
changed. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 844 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
KOZEL, supra note 16, at 4.
299. See supra Part IV.B.
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substantive merit of the initial decision if it is a harsh, skeptical re-
analysis that demonstrates broad but begrudging agreement with
the outcome and reasoning.300 When the Court reviews an older
precedent, it should typically uphold it because it has been approved
by skeptical jurists. By contrast, when the Court reviews a newer
precedent, it should lower the threshold to overruling in order to
ensure that the reviewing Justices fulfill their role as those
skeptical jurists whose review is worthy of respect by their descen-
dants.
The position I describe above is tentative and does not come
without caveats. Justices from the dissent in a prior case often
refuse to follow the majority’s rule later, even as it becomes
doctrinally entrenched over time301—though again, Chief Justice
Roberts’s recent opinion in June Medical Services stands as a
prominent outlier.302 Generally, it would seem likely that, when a
change in Court personnel renders a dissenting Justice suddenly a
majority Justice, they may be tempted to use the relative youth of
the decision as an excuse to overrule what was a perfectly accept-
able choice by the earlier Court. But that second review will at least
give the new Justice a chance to bring additional intellectual capital
to bear on the problem, with the possible result that the new Justice
will acknowledge the substantive correctness, or at least acceptabil-
ity, of the prior decision. In other words, the risk of rapid overruling
may be worth the reward of many steady long-term precedents in
the Court’s jurisprudence.
CONCLUSION
With little public or scholarly notice, Janus has solidified an
especially weak stare decisis tradition amongst many Justices and
300. See Nelson, supra note 8, at 36 (“[I]f each judge in the series had felt bound by the first
decision on the issue, then there would have been no difference between a series of decisions
and an isolated precedent; the chance that the series was correct would be identical to the
chance that the first decision was correct.”).
301. See HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL:
ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 2-3, 288 (1999); Powe, supra note
190, at 2112-14.
302. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2134 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
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emerged as a new leading precedent on precedents.303 Janus’s
discussion of whether to overrule Abood has threatened legal
stability and Court legitimacy in two ways. First, Janus elevated
the “poor reasoning” of a precedent to new prominence, suggesting
it was both a necessary condition to trigger stare decisis analysis
and a sufficient condition to overturn decisions. But poor reasoning
cannot play both roles; such a conception of stare decisis would be
unable to settle disputes independent of the Justices’ views about
the substantive correctness of a decision or the proper method to
achieve substantively correct results.304 Widespread adoption of
Janus would significantly undermine doctrinal stability, judicial
legitimacy, and legal consistency, all while rendering the stare
decisis doctrine itself so incoherent and unworkable that it could
hardly be considered a doctrine at all.
Second, Janus overemphasized the importance of a precedent’s
age in determining its precedential weight. It suggested that, while
the weak stare decisis tradition has generally disfavored young
precedents, it might also disfavor older precedents that are substan-
tively incorrect and may have been violating citizens’ rights for a
longer period.305 Janus’s claims thus lend support to overruling
nearly any precedent based upon its age, young or old. It opens the
door to a dangerous “wave theory” of stare decisis, under which
Justices can adopt weak or strong traditions over the course of their
careers as they suit their policy preferences. Instead, a decision’s
age, and subsequent decisions reaffirming it, should increase its
precedential weight, with perhaps a special examination of the
factual underpinnings of those decisions to guard against the
possible inapplicability of those precedents under changed factual
conditions. In addition, relatively new precedents should be subject
to critical review, thereby ensuring that when a precedent has aged
303. See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2445 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., concurring); Knick v.
Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2178 (2019); Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 2006
(2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Franchise Tax Bd. of Ca. v. Hyatt, 139 S. Ct. 1485, 1499
(2019).
304. See KOZEL, supra note 16, at 61.
305. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448,
2486 (2018) (“It is hard to estimate how many billions of dollars have been taken from
nonmembers and transferred to public-sector unions in violation of the First Amendment.
Those unconstitutional exactions cannot be allowed to continue indefinitely.”).
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well on the Court, it has been substantively reaffirmed by genera-
tions of Justices who had a genuine opportunity to reconsider it.
Janus-faced judging is only likely to increase on the Court in the
years to come, as more Justices find it a convenient mechanism for
overturning decisions with which they substantively disagree. This
Article sounds the alarm against such practices. It also analyzes the
proper role of a precedent’s reasoning and age in the stare decisis
calculus. Thus, it stands as a bulwark against a conception of the
stare decisis doctrine with the potential to do great damage to our
legal system and tradition.
